Challenge of the challenge of development : papers from a colloquium convened by The Lester Pearson Institute for International Development... Mar. 27 and 28 1992 by Dalhousie University & Tillett, A.D.
ARCHIV 
TILLET 




Papers from a Colloquium convened by the 
Lester Pearson Institute for International Development 
Dalhousie University, Halifax, Nova Scotia, Canada 
March 27 & 28, 1992 
The Lester Pearson Institute for 
International Development, 
Dalhousie University 
The Lester Pearson Institute for International Develop- 
ment (LPI) was founded in 1985 to promote Dalhousie's 
involvement in international development activities. In 
mid-1987, LPI was merged with the Centre for Devel- 
opment Projects and was given responsibility for over- 
sight of all externally financed development programmes 
and projects at Dalhousie. 
In addition to its administrative functions within the 
university, LPI undertakes major activities such as a 
development education programme for the campus 
and local community, a lecture and seminar series, 
conferences, research, a publications programme, and 
input to public policy on Canada's role in international 
development. 
Although LPI does not participate directly in academic 
degree programmes, it encourages and supports the 
study of international development issues and houses 
the Lester Pearson Chair in Development Studies. 
1321 Edward Street, Halifax, N.S. Canada B3H 3H5 
Tel: (902) 494-2038 Fax: (902) 494-1216 
E)- 
The Challenge of 
The Challenge of 
Development 
The Challenge of 




Papers from a Colloquium convened by the 
1,ester Pearson Institute for International Development 
Dalhousie University, Halifax, Nova Scotia, Canada 
March 27 & 28, 1992 
We acknowledge with gratitude the financial assistance of 
the International Development Research Centre (IDRC). 
Canadian Cataloguing in Publication Data 
Main entry under title: 
The Challenge of The Challenge of development 
Proceedings of a colloquium dedicated to the examination of 
the 1991 World development report and held in Halifax, N.S. 
in March 1992. Includes bibliographical references. 
ISBN 0-7703-9488-4 
1. World development report (1991) - Congresses. 
2. Economic development - Congresses. 
1. Tillett, A. 
U. Lester Pearson Institute for International Development. 
HD82.C52 1993 338.9 C93-098709-8 
Publication Management: 
Nancy Hayter 
Cover design and camera-ready copy: 
Hayswin Productions 
Printing: 
McCurdy Printing and Typesetting Limited 
Published by: 
The Lester Pearson Institute for International Development 
Dalhousie University, 1321 Edward Street 
Halifax, Nova Scotia Canada B3H 3H5 
1993 
Table of Contents 




1. The Challenge of Development: 
An Introduction 
A.D. TilleU ................................................................1 
2. Lessons of Development 
Vinod Thomas ........................................................27 
3. The Chicken & Egg Syndrome: 
Development Theory & Development Practice 
Barry Lesser ............................................................41 
4. International Agencies and Nation States: 
Dialogue for Development? 
Paul Bowles ............................................................51 
5. Does Development Assistance Matter? 
A.D. Tillen ...............................................................63 
Vi The Challenge of The Challenge of Development 
Part Two 
Commentaries 
The World Bank: Market-or People-Friendly? 
Ruben P. Mendez ....................................................85 
Progressive Capitalism 
Robert Miller ...........................................................95 
Markets, State and Technology 
Amitav Rath ...........................................................99 
An Open Letter to Mr. Vinod Thomas ..............107 
LPI Colloquium Programme ..............................111 
List of 
Tables, Figures, Appendices 
Tables 
1.1 Long Term Growth Performance ................................4 
1.2 Market-Friendly Elements .........................................11 
1.3 Policies for Action ...................................................12 
2.1 Historical Trends in GDP Per Capita .........................28 
2.2 Interaction of Policy with 
Education and Investment, 1965-87 ..........................33 
5.1 Total Resource Flows to 
Developing Countries ..............................................65 
5.2 Aid and Direct Foreign Investment ............................66 
5.3 Aid Dependency, 1989 ...........................................70 
5.4 Aid Dependency: 
GDP and Social Investment, 1989 ............................80 
5.5 World Bank Countries: 
ODA and DFI, 1989 ..........................................81-83 
Viii The Challenge of The Challenge of Development 
Figures 
1.1 The Interactions in a Market-Friendly 
Strategy for Development ..........................................6 
Appendices 
1.1 Developing Countries - 
Economic Growth and Exports, 1965-89 .............24-25 
Preface 
The second LPI Colloquium, which was held in March 1992, 
was dedicated to an examination of "The Challenge of Development", 
the World Development Report (1991). 
The colloquium format is flexible and puts a primacy on 
discussion and comment rather than formality; it is open, subject to 
space limitations, to all members of the community interested in 
development. We were fortunate to count Vinod Thomas, the 
principal author of the 1991 Report, among our guests. (Perhaps as 
a note of respect to his august institution, a number of students wrote 
him a letter of protest (pp. 107-109), which he took in stride.) 
This volume contains the revised proceedings of the Colloquium 
together with an introduction, three commentaries and the letter. 
Although the papers appear slightly later than intended, I hope that 
readers will agree that they continue to have value. We hope that they 
will stimulate discussion and ensure that the Bank's activities receive 
the critical examination that they surely deserve. 
The success of the Colloquium depended on the participation 
of staff, students and members of the community, all of whom showed 
that development issues remain an important interest to Canadians. 
We were stimulated by our visitors: Pierre Beemans (IDRQ Jim 
Carruthers (CIDA); Don McMaster (CIDA); Ruben Mendez (UNDP); 
Amitav Rath (PRI, Ottawa); Bob Miller (Parliamentary Centre, Ot- 
tawa); and Vinod Thomas (IBRD) who contributed a helpful dose of 
wisdom and tolerance to the discussions. In addition, Elisabeth Mann 
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Borgese gave a stimulating speech at the official dinner and Shirley 
Conover, Rowland Smith and Bob Clarke proved to be firm and 
prudent chairpersons. Our thanks to them all. 
The Colloquium was supported by Dalhousie University and by 
a grant from the International Development Research Centre (Ot- 
tawa). Our thanks to Chris Smart, Acting Director (who unfortunately 
was unable to be present) and to Melinda Glockling, Program 
Administrator, both of the Social Sciences Division. 
The Colloquium was organized by Barry Lesser, Associate 
Director of the Lester Pearson Institute and Professor in the Depart- 
ment of Economics, Dalhousie University, and Paul Bowles of St. 
Mary's University, Halifax. Nancy Hayter, Publications and Special 
Events Coordinator, undertook the arrangements with her customary 
skill and care, and has prepared this book for publication and 
distribution. The manuscript was typed by Bernie Misener who was 
able to make sense of the changes and revisions. They deserve 
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The World Development Report 1990 (WDR90) dealt with 
poverty. The World Development Report 1992 (WDR92) exam- 
ined environment and development. In between these two, the 
World Development Report 1991 (WDR91) dealt with the theme 
"the challenge of development" and is primarily concerned with, 
drawing on development theory and experience of the last thirty 
years, an identification of the factors that have made for successful, 
even sustainable, development. By extension, it is the absence of 
these factors which explain unsuccessful development. Chief amongst 
these factors is private markets; unsuccessful countries have evi- 
denced an over-reliance on government-led development and an 
under-reliance on market-led development. This conclusion gives 
rise to the principal recommendation of WDR91 which is a call for a 
so-called "market friendly strategy". 
2 The Challenge of Development 
This Report is a critical review of WDR91. It may seem, on the 
surface, to be somewhat out-of-date, WDR92 having already ap- 
peared and WDR93 being soon to appear. But the theme of 
WDR91 and its major conclusion/recommendations continue to 
make it timely to examine. More importantly, the three Reports 
from WDR90 to WDR92 are a package which in total defines the 
main planks of the World Bank view of development and develop- 
ment priorities for the foreseeable future. As such, WDR91 is 
especially important because there is a very real sense in which, 
despite its appearance in the middle of this troika of Reports, it is 
paramount. 
Both WDR90 and WDR92 go to considerable lengths to try to 
demonstrate that poverty alleviation and environmental integrity, 
respectively, are complementary to the goal of greater economic 
efficiency which is to be realized through a greater reliance on private 
market forces. If one is to critically assess these arguments, regard- 
less of whether the result is to agree or disagree, it is essential that 
one have a thorough and proper appreciation/understanding of the 
market friendly strategy advocated in WDR91. And it is through a 
thorough review of WDR91 itself that such an appreciation/under- 
standing can be gained. This, then, is the rationale behind this 
publication which is based on a colloquium on WDR91 held at 
Dalhousie University in March 1992. 
WDR 1991 
The World Development Report 1991 (WDR91) differs from 
previous World Development Reports because of three qualities: its 
comprehensive approach; the synthetic nature of its conclusions; 
and the forceful, not to say didactic, lessons which it is willing to draw 
for developing countries. These qualities are admirable even if the 
Challenge of Development explains more than it advocates and its 
advocacy of practice is based on principles which are not empirically 
verifiable, at least not definitively. 
The theme of WDR91, "the challenge of development", is as 
important as the institution that produced and endorsed it. Indeed 
the two are so closely linked, in the mind of the reader if not in the. 
text itself, that it is difficult not to think of WDR91 as the official view 
of the Bank, and one the Bank will use for direct programming. But 
the relationship is neither so direct nor the equation so simple. The 
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Challenge of Development is critical, in a way that the Directors of 
the Bank rarely appear to be, of industrial countries and multilateral 
agencies as well as of developing countries. Part of the appeal of the 
WDR also lies in its ability to make connections between disparate 
examples, move with ease between macro logic and micro evidence, 
and provide the reader with a comprehensive view of the world, 
particularly that part of the world which lacks wealth, security of 
fundamental rights and diminishing opportunities. The goals of 
improved welfare and the eradication of poverty, as advocated in the 
Report, will be shared by most conscientious people. But the method 
endorsed for accomplishing all of this, a confidence little short of 
absolute in the market or price mechanism, is the feature of the 
Report which is indistinguishable from the institution. It is this 
feature that makes many observers uneasy. 
The Challenge of Development seeks to draw lessons for 
developing countries from the experience of the past two decades, 
and by doing so, to clarify the factors that have made for successful, 
perhaps even sustainable, development. The Report, which is based 
on an impressive, if partial, quantity of evidence, concludes that 
economies should be "market friendly"; that governments can use- 
fully provide a framework for such activity; and that complementarity 
between market forces and government structures are essential for 
effective development. The Report explains, in a characteristically 
vigourous manner, that: 
If markets can work well, and they are allowed to, there can be 
substantial economic gain. If markets fail, and governments 
intervene cautiously and judiciously in response, there is a 
further gain. But if the two are brought together, the evidence 
suggests that the whole is greater than the sum. When markets 
and government have worked in harness, the results have been 
spectacular, but when they have worked in opposition,the 
results have been disastrous.' 
The remainder of WDR91 seeks to explore this message and adds, 
for good measure, a coda on the nature of government and the value 
of institutional change necessary to guarantee results. 
Long Term Growth 
If we accept for the moment the necessity of balance between 
government and markets, (while noting that much will depend on 
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definitions), long term growth is conventionally and conveniently 
illustrated as the rate of change on the level of per capita income; 
and if a case is to made for the thesis of the Report by examples 
from particular economies, as it must, then the illustrations are most 
likely to be found in those economies which have demonstrated 
strong per capita growth since 1965.2 At first, it might seem sensible 
to comprehend the differences by regions, which the Report relies 
on when discussing total factor productivity. If the world per capita 
average is the norm, gross domestic product per capita increased by 
1.6 percent during the period 1965-89 and East Asia was the only 
region clearly above the average.' However, by examining the com- 
plete list of countries, which is reproduced in Appendix 1. 1, pp. 24 - 
25, it is apparent that there is both greater variety and a greater 
dispersion in the long term growth experience than regional analysis 
admits. Table 1.1 attempts to simplify the long term growth experi- 
ence by taking the growth rate and examining the relative performance 
between 1965-80 and 1980-89 of industrial (I) and developing (D) 
economies for production and exports. The figures in the Table refer 
to the number of countries which achieved specified rates of growth 
in per capita income, total output and exports. As the Table shows, 
34 developing countries reached the world average for per capita 
income growth and more than 15 obtained per capita rates above 
3.2 percent per annum, that is, double the world average for the 
period 1965-89. 
Table 1.1 
Long Term Growth Performance (number of countries) 
Per GDP GDP Export Export 
Capita Growth Growth Growth Growth 
1965-89 1965-80 1980-89 1965-80 1980-89 
World 1.6 4.1 3.1 6.7 4.1 
Per Capita 
Growth Rates 
I D I D I D I D I D 
3.2+ 7 15 6 15 4 12 4 6 5 8 
1.6-3.1 13 19 5 16 4 10 9 5 8 13 
0.0-1.5 1 22 0 15 0 3 0 7 0 5 
-1.6-0.0 0 15 - 3 - 2 - 0 - 2 
-3.1-1.5 1 5 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 
Total 22 76 11 49 8 27 14 19 13 29 
Source: see Appendix 1.1, pp. 24-25. 
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The industrial countries tend to be in the upper ranges with one 
or two exceptions, but the Table demonstrates the superiority of 
country when compared to regional analysis for long term growth. 
There are, for example, five African countries, four countries from 
Europe and the Middle East and one from Latin America (Brazil) in 
the highest performance group of developing countries, with the 
remaining five being part of East Asia. However, there were 49 
countries with national economic increases over the world norm in 
the first period and only 27 in the second; export growth rates above 
the world average of 6.7 percent (1965-80) and 4.1 percent (1980- 
89) levels were registered by 19 and 29 developing countries 
respectively. These crude indicators are enough to show the range 
and variety of the growth experience among developing countries; 
one would expect WDR91 to concentrate on these in order to tell us 
why some countries have grown and others have not, but it does so 
only selectively. The Report has a card - in its view an ace - to explain 
why some countries have done well and that is the adoption of a 
"market friendly approach". 
How to be Market Friendly 
The Report advocates a "market friendly'' strategy (MFS) for 
development, the main elements of which are to be found in Figure 
1.1. The egg-shaped areas are the key ingredients. The exploration 
of these four "good eggs" are the foundation of the Report. 
(a) Investing in people: 
Recognizing that "markets in developing countries cannot 
generally be relied on to provide people ...with adequate 
education... health care, nutrition and family planning services" 
(p. 6), the Report examines health and education, both seen 
as ends in themselves but with substantial economic benefits. 
For example, "a one year increase in schooling can augment 
wages by more than 10 percent after allowing for other fac- 
tors' 14 as well as the potential to absorb modern technology. 
Further, education promotes entrepreneurship because of the 
increased capacity to take risks.' Rapid population growth is 
regarded as a threat to the environment and natural resource 
use, although it is admitted that "population growth may 
exacerbate other market failures beside the depletion of re- 
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sources ,116 such as urban congestion. Slower population growth 
is seen as an urgent requirement.' Governments should pro- 
mote preventative programs for "family planning, nutrition 
education and supplementation and perinatal care", although 
the Report acknowledges that, over time, developing country 
epidemiological profiles change and will require curative pro- 
grams.8 Educational policy should concentrate on expanding 
primary and secondary education rather than universities;' and 
will encourage equity as well as technological potential. The 
Report does not advocate an increase in financial resources; 
rather it advocates that "where public spending is warranted, it 
needs to be better targeted"10 and regards the `policy climate' 
as key to human resource investment. 
Figure 1.1 
The Interactions in a 
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Source: World Development Report 1991, "The Challenge of Develop- 
ment", Oxford University Press, 1991, p.6. 
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(b) The climate for enterprise: 
The second important feature of the MFS is creating an enter- 
prise climate which consists of "the right market signals, the 
right institutions and the right supportive investments". Indeed 
the task appears to be neither more nor less than nation 
building." This argument is based on three examples: first, 
agriculture where increased real prices and a reduction of 
subsidies have led to increasing production, based on aggre- 
gate supply responses. For this to occur there has to be an 
integrated policy package of economic incentives (exchange 
rates, prices, and public expenditures) together with comple- 
mentary factors (agricultural research and development, 
extension, credit and marketing services). The Report adds that 
such services do not necessarily have to be provided by state 
institutions or government agencies, rather the government 
should: 
let markets work and (to) facilitate the emergence of private 
programs, both domestically and externally ...(p. 77) 
Second, governments should thoroughly revise their industrial 
and labour regulations. In the case of the former, industrial 
regulations often decrease rather than increase competition 
and restrictive trade practices limit market growth.12 Employ- 
ment regulations, we are told confidently, "can undermine the 
link between pay and performance and also lead employers to 
hire fewer permanent workers' 113 and this employment prac- 
tice is seen as a particular danger for the public service. 
Third, when investment projects are measured for distortions 
in trade, foreign exchange, interest rates and fiscal deficits, 
economic rates of return are consistently higher in undistorted 
markets and lower in distorted markets.14 The same studies 
demonstrate the importance of competent managers, public 
participation, and a strong infrastructure. In the case of World 
Bank projects in particular and implicitly in the case of public 
sector projects in general, the Report draws the following 
lessons: 
First, it pays to limit public sector investment and institu- 
tional support to areas that help foster competition and the 
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private sector, rather than crowd it out. Second, external 
aid and lending agencies should promote the involvement 
of private sector and local communities in decisions about 
the provision of public services. Third, aid is likely to work 
much better when used for projects undertaken in competi- 
tive and market oriented climates. And finally, external 
agency support for improvements in policy climate pays 
off. Perhaps the most powerful rationale for supporting 
structural reforms is that they raise the productivity of 
investments - public and private. 
(c) Integration with the World Economy: 
The third bundle of the MFS advocates a greater reliance on 
the world market, particularly world price signals. Global eco- 
nomic integration has three dimensions: technology flows, 
direct foreign investment and trade. The first, technology 
flows, it is claimed, are encouraged by open economies, par- 
ticularly if governments are committed to a combination of 
domestic and international competition, while providing a 
suitable framework for the use of technology through mecha- 
nisms such as information services, norms and standards as 
well as intellectual property. Research and development is 
valued although national research laboratories are only tepidly 
endorsed (p. 92), as the MFS' main purpose is the encourage- 
ment of private firms. The second dimension, direct foreign 
investment, provides a channel for technology flows. (The 
Report has a Table showing that foreign firms are more 
productive than domestic firms in all of three countries)" It 
requires policies which reduce distortions and therefore a clear 
regulatory framework. Direct foreign investment flows, not 
surprisingly, will depend on bilateral relations 16 The third 
dimension, trade policy, is regarded as the most important 
mechanism for integration into the world economy; protection 
leads to price distortions and significant costs for consumers, 
increasing prices and lowering productivity." Although the Re- 
port admits to a number of successful market interventions by 
governments, in general these actions are regarded as risky 
and, in consequence, government's influence on trade policy 
should be limited to encouraging competition, reducing distor- 
tions and ensuring that interventions are finite (see p. 101). In 
summary, 
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Openness to trade has improved resource allocation, in- 
creased competition and product specialization and provided 
a broad avenue for technology transfer (p. 108). 
(d) Macroeconomic foundations: 
These are the corset of stabilization and adjustment - shape 
with flexibility. Developing country governments, in order to 
encourage both investment and stable expectations, have to 
revise their fiscal policies in order to bring taxation and ex- 
penditure into balance; defeat hyperinflation and reduce `normal' 
inflation; and ensure an equilibrium exchange rate. Although 
there are questions about the speed of the reform, the Report 
sees macroeconomic stability as a product as well as a result of 
credibility, encouraging complimentarity between policy goals 
and leading to higher domestic and foreign investment flows. 
Private investment flows are reduced by policies that favour the 
public sector (p. 119), and/or lead to high real interest rates 
and/or have a heavy debt burden (p. 120). The secret of the 
macroeconomic foundations lies in the revision in tasks of 
government and the private sector (p. 8). 
State Reform 
These four dimensions constitute the core of the MFS. In order 
to make the policies both explicit and permanent, a fifth dimension 
is added, namely, state or government reform, which is based on the 
following principle: 
governments need to do less is those areas where markets 
work, or can be made to work, reasonably well. Governments 
need to let domestic and international competition flourish 
(p. 9). 
The Report states that this principle will require a more honest 
examination of the costs of government economic direction than 
hitherto, not least a frank admission of the corrupt nature of many 
vested interests; greater participation leading to a social consensus 
about the goals of development; and a renewed concentration on 
equity and distribution principally by ensuring that public funds are 
targeted to the weak and poor. Further, governments should exam- 
ine their employment, military, public investment and transfer costs 
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in order to ensure that they are leaner and fitter for development 
tasks. 
The MFS Bundle 
The Market Friendly Strategy (MFS) assumes that prices, prin- 
cipally world prices, are the best policy signals. As most developing 
economies are only slowly inching toward MFS, if at all, Table 1.2 
attempts to illustrate its various dimensions in one convenient place. 
The three columns list first, the constituent elements of MFS; sec- 
ond, the indicators used to describe the sub-elements, and third, the 
policy aspects. One obvious conclusion from a cursory review of the 
Table is that the policy implications of a simple idea can be very 
complex. Because the package is likely to be implemented in differ- 
ent times and places, the Table reinforces the point made previously, 
of the enormous range and depth of developing country circum- 
stances. One recognizes that WDR91, for this reason if no other, 
hopes to reduce government tasks to a reflection of the market 
mechanism to allow government, by an agreed consensus, to con- 
centrate on overall policy or the macro-economic framework. In all 
the sections of the Report - from human resource development to 
government change - the leitmotif is the importance of structural 
reform, based on a redefinition and reduction of government func- 
tions, and in particular the benign climate which arises from the 
resulting stable macroeconomic framework. But to get to here from 
there - to cross the road in heavy and speeding traffic - requires not 
just skill, and perhaps a little luck, but an ability to make effective 
decisions; that is, it requires greater policy capacity. 
Policy Capacity 
Policy capacity can be defined, for the purposes of this intro- 
duction, as the competence to make effective policy decisions. Policy 
capacity is that area of national economic practice which permits 
choices to be made by governments. It lies, as a category, between 
institutional reform and state reorganization on the one hand, and 
development outcomes or results on the other. Thus a country like 
Japan, for example, has policy capacity because it went through the 
process of structural reform, described in the Report, and has a very 
successful record of growth and wealth creation.18 
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WDR91 discusses the manner by which policy capacity can be 
strengthened. Governments should act by following three rules: to 
intervene reluctantly, to apply checks and balances, and to intervene 
openly, that is, without side deals or negotiations. 19 The government 
thus becomes an umpire, with policy capacity having the ability to 
balance interests and settle disputes, and enforce rules which eco- 
nomic agents understand and respond to. With this we have entered 
a world of rational expectations based on common appetites and 
desires, which assumes a working, functioning'economy over which 
the solons of government sit. This idea is expanded in the final 
section of the Report and although, because of numerous examples, 
it has a greater sense of realism, it remains an elaboration of these 
three simple guidelines.20 The Report sees a happy marriage 
between market-led development and an appropriate policy envi- 
ronment. 
The complimentarity of a sound policy climate and market 
friendly interventions is one of the most encouraging lessons 
of development experience.21 
However, like any fairy tale, there is a dark side to the external world 
which requires not only the support of developing country govern- 
ments (and their populations) but other national and international 
agents; the latter must be willing to co-operate in order for economic 
rationality to function and suitable development to proceed. 
Table 1.3 - Policies for Action 
Industrial Developing 
POLICY ACTIONS IFIs 
Economies Economies 
Trade restrictions X 
Reform macroeconomic policy X 
Increase financial support x x 
Support policy reform x x 
Encourage sustainable growth x x 
Invest in people x 
Improve climate for enterprise X 
Open economies 
Get macroeconomic policy right X 
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Even in a Report which advocates reform tout court, there is a 
sensible (and prudent) recognition that structural change in develop- 
ing countries requires reform in industrial countries and multilateral 
institutions. These mutual obligations - you restructure and we will 
reform - are listed in the Report and translated into Table 1.3 with 
policy requirements shown for industrial countries and multinational 
institutions, as well as developing countries. Developing countries 
are, it should be noted, a far less coherent group than the G7 (or the 
OECD) and the International Financial Institutions (IFIs). Thus, the 
policy reform process depends not only on the good intentions of 
governments but on a number of other, and potentially more influ- 
ential and more cohesive, actors over whom developing countries 
have little control. So the weight of external to internal factors 
becomes a crucial consideration in the evolution of policy capability 
and might even be described as the test by which capability is proven. 
All discussants would agree that policy capacity is best judged 
by results and it is no surprise to find that many poorer countries 
have, as a combination of luck and judgement, objectively poor 
records. The counterpoint is to examine those countries which were 
objectively poor in the past, have prospered and are now wealthy or 
wealthier than expected. These are, of course, the countries which 
provide the examples for the global MFS. As a result, the argument 
often comes down to those who believe the East Asian countries are 
a special case (or a series of special cases) and so cannot be 
repeated, and those who argue that their example can or must be 
repeated in order for developing countries to grow and develop. The 
Report is clear on the issue; although there may be some differences 
in world trading conditions from forty or thirty years ago, govern- 
ments should evolve a policy capacity which mimics, as far as 
possible, the successful, and from the examples of WDR91, East 
Asian, countries. For development to succeed, governments should 
accept MFS; for MFS to succeed, governments should develop a 
policy capacity in three key areas: 
(a) Policy capacity and openness: 
Although there are many definitions of "openness", smaller 
economies, (a category which includes the majority of develop- 
ing economies)22 are unlikely to be able to pick and choose 
which aspects of the external world they will use and which 
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they will not. Indeed it is an agreed characteristic of developing 
countries that they are unable, except in a number of genuinely 
special cases '23 to influence world markets. Nevertheless, the 
Report appears to advocate MFS as a policy whatever the 
external circumstances '24 even though countries and the con- 
stituent dimensions that make up the MFS differ, and quite 
sharply, by their susceptibility to external, i.e., world trends. If 
sensible policy requires a higher than average probability over 
outcomes, a calculation of the degree of domestic as against 
external control is a crucial issue. 
The Report explicitly recognises the importance of "the cli- 
mate of development' 12' but by insisting on policy reform as an 
end in itself, glosses over the implicit quid pro quo between 
domestic and external factors. So developing countries might 
go through an adjustment process - liberalizing trade and prices 
- only to find a rapid growth of imports is not compensated by 
a strong inflow of direct foreign investment on the capital 
account, and that prosperity is strongly skewed to the wealthy. 
It is unclear how a strong educational policy, for example, can 
easily overcome short term financial imbalances which, given 
the global market, will need to be corrected at once. Again one 
can agree, for example, that the Uruguay Round of trade 
reform is an improvement on self-sufficient trading blocs but 
not that the Uruguay Round is itself able to provide greater 
opportunities to all, or even a high proportion of, developing 
countries. If an MFS policy capacity is to succeed it will have to 
be recognized that a high proportion of decisions are weighted 
on co-operation with the developed countries (and donor insti- 
tutions) on their terms, and if not on their terms, then in a way 
which is not necessarily under the control of any national 
government. 
World economic growth will therefore play a crucial role. The 
World Bank's baseline projection assumes that between 1990 
and 2000, the output of OECD member countries will grow at 
2.9 percent and world trade will grow by 5.8 percent in real 
terms; developing countries are estimated to grow by 4.9 
percent.21 Although the Report pays obeisance to the risks 
inherent in reform, it states that "better domestic policies could 
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raise GDP growth by twice as much as external factors" and at 
a later point: 
...an increase of 1 percentage point in the growth of the 
OECD could raise the developing countries's growth over 
the long term by 0.7 percent.27 
External factors, therefore, play an important and more than a 
facilitating role. Combining these figures, OECD or industrial 
country growth is estimated to account for 41 percent of 
developing country growth (i.e. 2.9 x .7) with the remaining 58 
percent a result of domestic sources of growth, presumably the 
result of policy reform.28 However, by treating all developing 
countries as a single unit or regional groups, the Report does 
not come to terms with domestic policy making, nor allow for 
the implicit and explicit competitions between developing coun- 
tries for OECD markets. Assuming that all countries can 
undertake policy reform, it is unlikely that all countries can reap 
the same benefits; a positive balance of payments for all, for 
example, is a logical impossibility. Moreover, there is a danger 
in assuming that all countries have the same capacity to under- 
take reforms and reap the same beneficial results, not only 
because developing countries start from different initial condi- 
tions, but because larger countries have greater scope to practice 
policy capacity and to trade off different potential outcomes in 
a flexible way. The advice may be more valuable for middle 
income countries, which have a greater range of economic 
alternatives, than low income countries which, with the excep- 
tion of China and India,"' have a smaller scope and greater 
possibilities of failure. The increased growth and development 
of low income countries depends on the willingness of OECD 
countries to play their part and meet their obligations. 
(b) Policy capacity and trade-offs: 
At the heart of policy capacity is an ability to make trade-offs, a 
skill which will be firmly tested if the world economic climate 
turns from benign, to sour. 
The Report deals with trade-offs in two ways, first as a norma- 
tive process, which helpfully emphasises the `art of reform' 
and places a premium on the credibility of the macro-reform 
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process while favouring rapid over gradual reform, not least 
because the requirements of "adjustment usually take place in 
a time of crisis"." Although WDR91 recognizes three success- 
ful examples of gradualism (Japan, Korea and Thailand), it 
argues that it was because they took place in strong and stable 
economies that they prospered, so that "in general, the ana- 
lytic case for speed is strong". Second, the Report provides 
positive evidence from an evaluation of World Bank projects 
which purports to show that openness increases the average 
rate of return on investment from 8 to 10 percent.31 Openness 
is calculated on the basis of four indices: the real rate of 
interest, the fiscal deficit, and foreign exchange and trade 
restrictions. The published rates of return show the biggest 
gains when distortions are removed from the foreign exchange 
premium (moving from a high to low premium permits gains of 
9.5, followed by a reduction in trade restrictions (6.9), the fiscal 
deficit (4.4) and the real interest rate (2.3). The figures suggest 
that a combination of foreign exchange and trade restrictive- 
ness are the most powerful combination 32 whereas reductions 
in the fiscal deficit (as a percent of GDP) have their greatest 
impact when the share of public investment has a range of 6 
and 10 percent of GDP. The information is used to show the 
importance of the quality of government decisions, but it fails, 
because given the data, it cannot, establish which policy vari- 
ables have the greatest comparative effect. Therefore the issue 
of trade-offs is subsumed under a general appeal for reform. 
Perhaps if there is one lesson, it is that policy capacity is best 
served by attention to exchange rate distortions. However, 
there must be some skepticism about the sample and the 
methods since World Bank projects pass through a number of 
technical and political nets, hence, their probability of success, 
when compared to non-WB projects, is high. 
(c) Policy capacity and employment: 
The case for developing policy capacity with regard to employ- 
ment should be clear; personal consumer expenditure is the 
basis of most, if not all, domestic markets and the principle 
source of savings ;33 without employment and job creation, it is 
difficult to see how growth or development can be sustained. 
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Yet the WDR does not discuss employment directly even 
when examining labour mobility, human resource develop- 
ment and wages. The Report's avoidance of labour issues 
reflects the present data composition of the World Develop- 
ment Indicators (produced annually as an Appendix to the 
WDR) which last included a labour or employment series in the 
1988 edition. 
Labour and employment are treated as a kind of social cushion 
or residual to other, market friendly, growth processes. Public 
sector employment regulation, for example, undermines "the 
link between pay and performance and leads employers to hire 
fewer permanent workers. 1134 Education is linked to wages3s 
but not to employment and there is no discussion of the 
informal sector which possibly will have to absorb - if the 
recommended human resource development strategies are 
followed - an increasingly educated population. In general, 
employment is equated with wages, rather than structure, and 
there is the impression that wage rates must be kept flexible in 
order to permit the policies which produce MFS to flourish. 
The unwillingness to examine labour and employment is glar- 
ing, not to say perverse, when analyzing technology which the 
WDR describes as the principle source of productivity change. 
Early in the Report we are told: 
The crucial question for the future is whether national and 
international policies will permit the potential created by 
technological progress to be exploited." 
The employment implications of the argument are avoided. 
There is a brief recognition that high wage costs stimulate 
capital intensity and so impair allocation decisions37 but there is 
no discussion of the counter-arguments that current technol- 
ogy is essential for export markets as a guarantor of product 
quality; or the difficulty of obtaining investment credits for 
second hand machinery; or that capital is strongly associated 
with long term growth trends only when the relative growth of 
wages falls below a compressed ceiling.311 Technology does not 
necessarily create employment, even when markets grow. 
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Technology is also, and perhaps increasingly, proprietary and 
MFS, may well encourage this trend; as markets are broadened 
there is a greater need for protection. Two illustrations will 
suffice. First, as part of the argument against trade protection, 
the Report advocates long term trading relationships between 
buyers and sellers of specific technologies, and yet does not 
consider the unwillingness of owners to share their technology 
as against their techniques.3' Second, there is no discussion of 
the threat, faced by farmers in developing countries, of a move 
away from public (and free) techniques - the foundation of the 
international research and development system for agriculture 
(see Box 4.1) - to private (and royalty) patent ownership of new 
technological advances in biotechnology. These and other 
research results will no longer be a free and public good. The 
MFS emphasises private returns in a competitive market (and 
its associated legal instruments) and underestimates the value 
of public and general diffusion of technological knowledge for 
employment growth. 
Rapid population growth coupled with growing resource costs 
require greater attention to employment opportunities and 
their generation. Where market opportunities have not been 
able to generate employment, governments have relied on an 
economy of casual opportunities and livelihoods such that the 
informal sector has grown to become a cushion for other 
government policies. The result is a wage rate dualism; labour 
costs define the modern sector and the remaining employment 
seekers supply the informal sector. The MFS applies to the 
former, domestically and internationally; only greater policy 
capacity can assist the latter. 
Conclusions 
This brief overview describes the Bank's core analysis, as 
represented in The Challenge of Development. The success of the 
Report is in placing on record the analytic framework which has 
become part of the Bank's operational behaviour. Bank officials 
often argue that the ends justify the means and that it is too early for 
the policies to have been completely successful. However, waiting is 
rarely a persuasive argument for nations with responsive political 
systems. It is unclear, because of the limited number of examples, if 
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evidence is not to be generated from a broader base and with a 
greater sense of the policy capacity of different national units. 
Too often MFS is an assertion which excludes inconvenient 
changes - employment is a case in point - and sees each country as 
an example of a universal. One does not need, as the following 
papers show, to fall into the trap (in Dudley Seers' telling phrase) of 
assuming that "every case is a special case" in order to question the 
homogeneity assumption of the Report. Internationalization and its 
associated attributes require comparisons, but one conclusion, con- 
firmed for domestic cases, can well be applied to the world economy: 
the need for greater regulation and balance or fairness, particularly 
between developing and developed countries. Whatever its inten- 
tions, the Report leaves the impression that the foundation for 
economic change is domestic rather than international, and it fol- 
lows that the principle responsibility lies, in almost all cases, with the 
developing country. MFS is, however, a package which calls on 
industrial countries to restructure - as uncomfortable as this may be - 
and to permit greater access for developing country goods and 
services; MFS requires a quid pro quo to yield results. 
The WDR is a considerable achievement and provides intellec- 
tual basis for many Bank actions. As the Bank remains the most 
important institution for all developing countries, its views are vital 
for their, and incidentally our, development policies. The Colloquium 
and the papers that follow are intended to continue a debate whose 
importance cannot be underestimated. 
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NOTES 
'The Challenge of Development, World Development Re- 
port (1991) p. 2, (emphasis added). 
2 The World Development Indicators, an integral part of the 
Report, only provide per capita income measures for the long 
period, 1965-89 (see T. 1, p. 204-205), whereas for all other 
measures, the period is divided into two, (1965-80) and (1980-89) 
reflecting two different sets of world conditions. Attempts to calcu- 
late per capita income for the two periods from the Indicators, 
without the raw data, can lead to uncertain conclusions. 
3 The averages are SubSaharan Africa (0.3 percent per year), 
South Asia (1.8) and Latin America and the Caribbean (1.9). No 
figure is given for Europe, the Middle East and North Africa. The 
OECD countries had an average annual rate of 2.5 percent (see 
World Development Indicators, T. 1, p. 205). 
a Based on evidence of 11 countries at different periods, (Cote 
d'Ivoire, Ghana, Korea, Indonesia, Peru, Malaysia, Nicaragua, Thai- 
land and France, USA and Spain). 
5 The evidence for this statement is based on surveys of existing 
entrepreneurs and interestingly, given the general unwillingness to 
support universities by the Bank, a high percentage of Thai entre- 
preneurs have degrees; in Malaysia, while admitting that family 
wealth and ethnicity play an important role, "enterprise size is 
positively associated with the entrepreneur's years of education," so 
confusing the causality implicit in the argument. 
6 There is a discussion of the differing private and social costs 
and benefits of children, which is then linked to the removal of trade 
barriers and economies of scale (p. 59). 
"Studies have found that a doubling of government expendi- 
tures per capita on family planning programs in urban areas would 
reduce infant mortality in Colombia and that a twenty percent rise in 
the proportion of villages with a family planning clinic would reduce 
infant mortality by more than 4 percent in India" (p. 60). 
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8 See p. 62. 
9 "Governments will need to be more selective in choosing 
which level of education or training to improve, which costs to 
meet ...and whom to subsidize" (p. 64). 
1OSee p. 66 with the paragraph continuing "Government spend- 
ing is not always efficient or equitable." 
" "Markets for goods, inputs, labour and capital need to be 
better integrated; from the farm to the town, from the city to the 
market abroad" (p. 70). 
12 "Internal and external restrictions often exist side by side, 
compounding each other's adverse effects on technological progress 
and industrial productivity" (p. 79). 
13 Although fewer "permanent workers" would, in the logic of 
this Report be a benefit, providing they were infinitely flexible at the 
micro level. 
14 See T. 4.2, p. 82. 
15 See T. 5.1 which compares firms in the Cote d`Ivoire, 
Venezuela and Morocco, using relative output per worker and net 
foreign exchange earnings (foreign sales/X-M). The figures are pre- 
sented as percentages and appear to show that first there is small 
output increase in majority owned foreign firms in all countries while 
domestic firms export more. 
16 "The extent to which direct flows contribute to growth 
depends largely on the effectiveness of host country policies. The 
scope for increased inflows of DFI to developing countries will also 
be determined by industrial country policies" (p. 97). 
17 "...there is a general statistical association between less 
intervention and lower price distortions on the one hand and higher 
productivity growth on the other" (p. 99). 
18 See Box 2.2 "What's behind the Japanese economic mira- 
cle?" and the use made of Japan as an example throughout the text. 
19 See p. 5 for these useful rules. 
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"See Box 8.1 entitled "For policymakers everywhere; seven 
lessons in reform" (p. 152), which deals with ownership, policy 
flipflops, institutional requirements, macroeconomic stability, vulner- 
able people, the failure of partial attempts, and realism. 
21 WDR, p. 5. 
22 Measured by either population or the size of the economy. 
23 Where they have a monopoly or near monopoly of a natural 
resource or commodity. 
24 "This Report will show that what matters most for any 
country's economic development is its own approach to economic 
policies and institutions" (p. 12); and for example, pp. 45/46: "... 
developing countries should not slow their reform efforts simply 
because of rising protection in industrial ones" (p. 105). 
2e See Box 1.3 where the climate of development consists of 
the following dimensions: world trade, capital flows, world finance, 
industrial policy, security, technology, energy and the environment 
(p. 22). 
28 See pp. 27 and 30. East Asian economic output is expected 
to grow by 7.2 percent during the decade. 
27 And continues, "Conversely, a 1 percent increase in L.IBOR 
could reduce growth by 0.2 percentage point. A 1 percent increase 
in the growth of OECD is also estimated to lead to a 0.2 percent 
increase in exports from developing countries" (p. 123). 
28 On the basis of 40 case studies, the WDR claims that "better 
domestic policies could raise GDP growth by twice as much as better 
external factors" (p. 30). 
29 See Appendix 1.1 for the overwhelming impact of these 
countries. 
30 The art of reform consists of credibility, macroeconomic 
stability, timing, speed, scope, and sequencing, see pp. 116-118. 
31 Based on post project evaluations of 1,200 projects in 58 
developing countries which were undertaken between 1960 and 
1978/79, see p. 162. 
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32 "...when included along the parallel premiums and trade 
restrictiveness variables, the real interest rate variable loses all eco- 
nomic and statistical significance" (p. 162). 
33 "The larger the fraction of income received by workers at the 
peak of their earnings, the higher the overall savings rate" (WDR91, 
p. 121). 
34 See p. 80 f. 
35 See p. 57. 
1 See p. 2. 
37 See the discussion of the overcapitalized textile industry of 
the Cote d1voire. 
3s The total factor productivity calculations show that labour 
makes its greatest long term contribution to growth when the pro- 
portion of capital is greatest. For example, when labour contributes 
more than 20 percent to growth, 1973-87, there is negative total 
factor productivity. Education is treated as a separate input from 
labour (or wages) in the growth accounting scheme. 
39 There is evidence (p. 96) that there is little close association 
between DFI and technology; while private gains from innovation 
are crucial to any part of investment package (p. 98), 
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Appendix 1.1 




Country Per capita Pop. (mn) Production Production Exports Exports Growth 1990 Growth (1) Growth (2) (1) (2) 
World 1.6 4.1 3.1 6.7 4.1 
68 Botswana 8.5 1.2 13.9 11.3 - - 
95 Oman 6.4 1.5 13.0 12.8 - - 
21 China 5.7 1,113.9 6.9 9.7 - 11.5 
32 Lesotho 5.0 1.7 6.8 3.7 - - 
33 Indonesia 4.4 178.2 7.0 5.3 9.6 2.4 
64 Thailand 4.2 55.4 7.3 7.0 8.6 12.8 
44 Egypt 4.2 51.0 7.3 5.4 -0.1 9.2 
77 Malaysia 4.0 17.4 6.3 2.8 4.6 9.8 
94 Korea 4.0 42.4 9.9 9.7 27.2 118 
10 Burundi 3.6 5.3 7.1 4.3 - 2.6 
85 Brazil 3.5 147.3 9.0 3.0 9.3 5.6 
66 Tunisia 3.3 8.0 6.5 3.4 10.8 4.1 
55 Congo 3.3 2.2 6.2 3.9 10.3 6.2 
57 Cameroon 3.2 11.6 5.1 3.2 4.9 -3.3 
88 Yugoslavia 3.2 23.7 6.1 1.3 5.6 0.4 
56 Syria 3.1 12.1 9.1 1.6 11.4 5.7 
31 Sri Lanka 3.0 16.8 4.0 4.0 0.2 6.7 
59 Ecuador 3.0 10.3 8.8 1.9 15.1 5.0 
61 Paraguay 3.0 4.2 7.0 2.2 6.5 7.0 
75 Mexico 3.0 84.6 6.5 0.7 7.7 3.7 
74 Mauritius 3.0 1.1 5.2 5.7 3.1 10.5 
93 Portugal 3.0 10.3 5.3 2.5 3.4 11.7 
97 Greece 2.9 10.0 5.8 1.6 11.9 4.1 
67 Turkey 2.6 55.0 6.2 5.1 5.5 11.4 
24 Pakistan 2.5 109.9 5.2 6.4 -1.8 8.5 
50 Dominican R. 2.5 7.0 8.0 2.4 0.3 1.2 
78 Algeria 2.5 24.4 - 3.5 1.8 2.9 
63 Colombia 2.3 32.3 5.7 3.5 1.4 9.8 
51 Morocco 2.3 24.5 5.7 4.1 3.7 5.7 
23 Kenya 2.0 23.5 6.8 4.1 3.9 1.6 
20 India 1.8 832.5 3.6 5.3 3.0 5.8 
16 Mali 1.7 8.2 4.2 3.8 9.5 5.6 
48 Philippines 1.6 60.0 5.9 0.7 4.6 1.3 
70 Panama 1.6 2.4 5.5 0.5 -5.7 0.1 
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WB Country Per capita Pop. (mn) Production Production, Exports Exports 
No. Growth 1990 Growth (1) Growth (2) (1) (2) 
18 Burkina Faso 1.4 8.8 5.0 3.6 0.8 
72 Costa Rica 1.4 2.7 6.3 2.8. 7.0 3.1 
19 Rwanda 1.2 6.9 4.9 1.5 7.9 -0.8 
47 Zimbabwe 1.2 9.5 5.0 2.7 - 3.8 
87 Uruguay 1.2 3.1 2.4 0.1 4.6 2.8 
7 Malawi 1.0 8.2 5.5 2.7 5.1 2.9 
54 Guatemala 0.9 8.9 5.9 0.4 4.8 -11.7 
89 Gabon 0.9 1.1 9.5 1.2 8.6 -0.2 
49 Cote d'lvoire 0.8 11.7 6.8 1.2 5.5 3.1 
84 South Africa 0.8 35.0 4.1 1.5 7.8 -8.0 
8 Nepal 0.6 18.4 1.9 4.6 - 11.2 
53 Honduras 0.6 5.0 5.0 2.3 3.1 2.1 
90 Iran 0.5 53.3 6.1 2.4 - 21.6 
5 Bangladesh 0.4 110.7 2.5 15 - 7.6 
91 Trinidad 0.4 1.3 5.0 -5.5 -5.5 -5.1 
22 Haiti 0.3 6.4 2.9 0.5 5.5 -6.9 
4 Somalia 0.3 6.1 3.5 3.0 4.4 -4.6 
71 Chile 0.3 13.0 1.9 2.7 8.0 4.9 
11 Sierra Leone 0.2 - 4.0 2.7 0.6 -2.4 -2.5 
13 Nigeria 0.2 113.8 6.1 -0.4 11.1 -2.3 
52 Papua N.G. 0.2 3.8 4.1 2.1 14.1 6.4 
28 Togo 0.0 3.5 4.3 1.4 - 3.1 
2. Ethiopia -0.1 49.5 2.7 1.4 -0.5 0.4 
3 Tanzania -0.1 23.8 3.9 2.6 -4.2 -8.2 
25 Benin -0.1 4.6 2.2 1.8 - - 
76 Argentina -0.1 31.9 3.4 -0.3 4.7 0.8 
83 Venezuela -0.1 19.2 3.7 1.0 -9.5 11.3 
58 Peru -0.2 21.2 3.9 0.4 1.6 0.4 
96 Libya -0.3 4.4 4.2 - - - 
62 El Salvador -0.4 5.1 4.3 0.6 1.0 -1.6 
26 Ctl. African R. -0.5 3.0 2.8 1.4 -1.3 -3.7 
34 Mauritania -0.5 1.9 2.1 1.4 4.0 3.4 
45 Senegal -0.7 7.2 2.1 3.1 2.6 2.5 
43 Bolivia -0.8 7.1 4.4 -0.9 2.7 -0.8 
9 Chad -1.2 5.5 0.1 6.5 - - 
65 Jamaica -1.3 2.4 1.4 1.2 -0.4 -2.1 
27 Ghana -1.5 14.4 1.3 2.8 -2.6 5.6 
12 Madagascar -1.9 11.3 1.6 0.8 0.6 -2.2 
15 Zaire -2.0 34.5 1.8 1.9 - 0.6 
29 Zambia -2.0 7.8 2.0 0.8 -0.7 -3.2 
17 Niger -2.4 7.4 0.3 -1.6 12.8 -3.8 
14 Uganda -2.8 16.8 0.6 2.5 -2.9 4.3 
Notes: 1) 1965-80; 2) 1980-89. Source: World Development Report, (1989). 
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LESSONS OF DEVELOPMENT 
Vinod Thomas 
In the midst of a global recession, it may not be evident that 
the business of economic development is working, but consider the 
following. Average incomes in developing countries have doubled 
over the past three decades, increasing faster than in the United 
Kingdom, the United States, or Japan during growth spurts. People 
in developing countries now live some 10 years longer on average 
than in 1960 - twice the gain the United States could achieve by 
eliminating both cancer and heart disease. The rate of infant deaths 
has been nearly halved, child death rates have plummeted, and 
immunization rates have soared. 
Economic growth has been most remarkable in East Asia, 
where economies, such as Hong Kong, Korea, Singapore and 
Taiwan, have seen living standards rise more than fivefold in a 
generation. Averages in human development have been striking in a 
wider range of countries. Costa Rica and China, for example, have 
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witnessed a stunning increase of over 20 years in average life 
expectancy. In Chile or Thailand where in 1960, 100 out of every 
1,000 infants born did not survive to age one, the lives of 75 of those 
100 infants are being saved today thanks to improvements in in- 
come and health technology. 
Having noted these achievements, however, we must also 
emphasize that development is not working everywhere. The im- 
pressive average performance of the developing world conceals 
tremendous diversity. In contrast to the dramatic growth record in 
the East Asian economies, living standards have fallen or hardly 
improved in three dozen countries with a total population of nearly 
half a billion people. And average incomes across the continents in 
the developing world have diverged - precisely the opposite of what 
has been happening among industrial countries. Asia's average 
income increased from 15% of the OECD's to 28% in 1989 (Table 
2.1). But Africa's declined from 11% of the OECD in 1950 to 5% in 
1989, and Latin America's from 52% to 31%. 
Table 2.1 - Historical Trends in GDP Per Capita 
Growth Rate 
Region or Group 1830 1913 1950 1973 1989 1913-50 1950-89 
375 510 487 1,215 2,812 -0.1 3.6 
Asia 
(40) (23) (15) (I6) (28) 
Latin America 
1,092 1,729 2,969 3,164 1.2 1.2 
(49) (52) (40) (31) 
Sub-Saharan Africa 
348 558 513 0.8 
(II) (8) (5) 
Europe, Middle East 940 2,017 2,576 2.0 
and North America (29) (27) (26) 
Eastern Europe 
600 1,263 2,128 4,658 5,618 1.4 2.0 
(84) (57) (65) (63) (56) 
Developing Economies 701 
830 1,599 2,796 2.7 
(32) (25) (22) (28) 
OECD Members 935 2,220 3,298 7,396 10,10 1.1 2.3 
Note: Data presented are simple averages of GDP per capita. Numbers in parentheses 
are regional GDP per capita as a percentage of GDP in OECD economies. Regional 
groupings include only non-high-income countries. Hungary is included in Eastern 
Europe group, not in Europe, Middle East and North Africa. 
Sources: For 1830-1965, Maddison, background paper. Data for 1950-85 for Africa 
and Middle East are based on OECD; data after 1985 are based on growth rates from 
World Bank data base. Benchmark values are 1980 international dollar estimates from 
Maddison, background paper, if available; from Summers and Heston 1984, otherwise. 
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These sharp differences are the logical starting point for any 
review of the lessons of development. Why has economic perform- 
ance varied so much in the developing world? What must governments 
do to quicken the pace of progress? And what must markets be 
allowed to do for greater success in development? Addressing each 
of these questions in turn in the next three sections, this paper 
argues that the key explanation of country performance lies in the 
respective roles accorded to the state and market - and the effective- 
ness with which the two interact in the pursuit of development. We 
turn in the final section to some practical issues for reforming the 
state and the market. 
DETERMINANTS OF ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 
Success in national development is the direct result of national 
policies and failure cannot be blamed on the external environment 
or on any physical limits to growth. True, global factors - such as 
OECD growth rates, international interest rates and trade restric- 
tions - affect the pace of development in the aggregate. But they do 
not explain why growth rates among developing countries vary so 
much. Under similar global conditions - favourable of unfavourable - 
countries have fared very differently because they have behaved very 
differently. 
Lack of external financing is often identified as the reason for 
poor performance. Undoubtedly, external capital and foreign aid 
matter for development. But how effectively countries use capital 
matter even more. An improvement in the productivity of capital as 
small as two-tenths of one percent produces a gain in output that 
would have required $100 billion in additional capital at previous 
levels of productivity. The evidence in World Development Report 
1991 convincingly demonstrates that the productivity of capital use 
varies systematically across countries, according to their domestic 
policies and institutions. Consider investment projects financed by 
the World Bank as an example. The rate of return on projects is 
much higher in countries that have market-oriented policy regimes. 
That means that, for better development performance, coun- 
tries need to look first to their domestic strategies. But no single 
consideration fully captures the requirements for success. Rather, 
the domestic factors that matter the most coalesce into its several 
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clusters of factors, that can be summarized by the four 'T's: invest- 
ments, incentives, institutions - and interactions among the three. 
Supportive Investments 
No country has developed without adequate investments in 
people, especially in their education and health. Such investments 
were the hallmark of development in Scandinavia, Germany and 
Japan, just as they were in the later development of the East Asian 
"tigers". What distinguishes all these countries is the size and the 
quality of their expenditures on human development. 
So we know how important investments in people are, yet in 
many countries military spending exceeds the combined spending 
on health and education, which too often, comes to less than 5% of 
GDP. Spending priorities within the social sectors are also often 
misplaced. For instance, vast sums of money are spent on a large 
school or hospital, rather than on teaching materials and vaccines 
for hundreds of rural primary schools and basic health clinics. In 
many countries, heavy subsidies are provided for higher education at 
the expense of spending on primary education, where the social 
returns are very high. 
An efficient domestic economy also requires sound invest- 
ments in infrastructure. Adequate roads, ports, power and 
telecommunications ease the way for successful development, as 
does investment in agricultuial irrigation and research, where returns 
can be exceptionally high. Where such infrastructure is absent or 
dilapidated, as it is in many developing countries, sustained growth 
cannot take place. 
Proper Incentives 
Investments, however, are far from sufficient. They need to be 
guided by a sound set of economy-wide incentives. And proper 
incentives require macroeconomic stability and competitive markets. 
High fiscal deficits and high inflation prevent the proper functioning 
of markets and cause development to stumble. Where that is so, 
incentives can be put in order only by restoring and maintaining 
macroeconomic stability. 
In addition, investments go to waste in an economy full of price 
distortions or blocked off from the rest of the world. Openness to 
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global and domestic competition is essential for encouraging domes- 
tic producers to develop by adopting and adapting new products and 
techniques. Openness promotes the international flow of technol- 
ogy - through movements of people, foreign investments, imports, 
and exposure to foreign markets - and subjects domestic firms to the 
growth-stimulating rigors of international competition. When com- 
plemented by domestic competition, this exposure spurs innovation, 
the diffusion of technology, and the efficient use of resources. 
Conversely, systems of industrial licensing, restrictions on entering 
or exiting markets, and state controls on managers, employees and 
prices - all of which weaken the forces of competition - hold back 
development. 
The Role of Institutions 
Investments and policies are not made in a vacuum; they 
require well-developed institutions to give them shape and to make 
them effective. Well-functioning institutions are also critical for fos- 
tering competition, as the socialist economies in transition are 
.finding out. Especially important is a legal and judicial system that 
secures property rights, safeguards contracts, and facilitates transac- 
tions. As important is a simple regulatory framework that is 
transparent and that does not stifle competition. 
Heavy and misguided regulatory interference has hampered 
technological change and productivity growth in many countries, 
and has encouraged corruption and waste. 
Countries need to provide the infrastructure for development 
while resisting interventions that are economically unproductive. An 
effective tax administration, to meet resource needs and equity 
objectives, and a strong central bank are key institutions that the 
state also needs to provide. Important too, is the capacity to conduct 
effective policy analysis and to implement policies well. And to take 
care of those who cannot care for themselves, safety nets to protect 
vulnerable groups need to be put in place. Where these institutions 
and institutional capabilities are absent - and they often are - they 
need to be developed (a time-consuming process that requires invest- 
ments in the right type of human capital). 
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Interaction and Payoffs 
It may not surprise anyone that each of these factors - invest- 
ments, incentives, institutions - is important for development. But 
the evidence goes further, and some of it is more surprising. The 
history of development shows a strong synergism among invest- 
ments, incentives, and institutions in development. Consider, for 
instance, the payoffs to combining investments and proper incen- 
tives. There are a number of examples of the disproportionate 
benefits of combining investments in people with ensuring competi- 
tion. For instance, Eastern Europe did well in educational investment, 
but not in fostering competition. East Asia did well in both. And the 
difference in outcomes is striking. 
Table 2.2 considers the interaction between economic policies 
on one side and investment in education and physical capital on the 
other. The combined impact of the two on GDP growth or on total 
factor productivity growth is especially strong. For instance, coun- 
tries that invested in primary education or that fostered a competitive 
environment grew at about 3.8% during 1965-87. Countries that did 
both grew at 5.5%. 
WHAT THE STATE MUST DO 
FOR RAPID DEVELOPMENT 
It may be unconventional today to focus on what the state must 
do rather than what the free market must do. But it really is not a 
question of state or market; each has an important and irreplaceable 
role. The dichotomy between intervention and laissez-faire is popu- 
lar but false. It is more a question of a realignment of roles, of what 
the state must and must not do, and how, and what the market must 
be allowed to do, and how. In some areas, governments must take 
the lead, and in some., markets must be allowed to do so. The state 
is responsible for establishing a sound macroeconomic framework. 
The state also needs to ensure the provision of basic services, such 
as primary education and primary health care, and step in other 
areas where markets typically fail, such as infrastructure, poverty 
programs, and the environment. 
Sound Macroeconomic Policy 
For sustained progress, the state must put in place sound 
macroeconomic policies that keep fiscal deficits in check and ex- 
change rates at realistic levels. Fiscal deficits result from rapid growth 
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Table 2.2 
Interaction of Policy with 
Education and Investment, 
1965-87 
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Average Average Probability Probability 
GDP TPP of hgher of higher 




Policy'distorton' (a) and education (b) 
Low distortion and high education level 5.5 1.40 63.7 53.9 
Loa distortion and law education level 3.8 0.25 52.0 49.9' 
High distortion and high education level 3.8 0.00 35.7 38.1 
High distortion and low education level 3.1 -0.40 42.0 46.0" 
Policy'distortion' (a) and change in education (c) 
Low distortion and high rate of increase in education 5.3 1.30 57.0 54.3 
Loa distortion and low rate of increase in education 4.0 0.40 55.1 48.8' 
High distortion and high rate of increase in education 3.5 -0.16 35.0 39.7 
High distortion and low rate of increase in education 3.4 -0.19 39.2 44.7" 
Policy'distortion' (a) and investment (d) 
Low distortion and high investment 5.2 0.91 73.6 56.5 
Law distortion and low investment 3.5 0.75 35.6 46.4' 
High distortion and high investment 4.6 0.07 53.8 44.0 
High distortion and low investment 2.6 -0.36 26.7 41.2' 
Note: All results are significant at the 5 percent level unless marked with an 
asterisk ('), in which case they are not significant. 
a) High distortion is reflected by a foreign exchange premium of more 
than 30 percent; low distortion, 30 percent; 
b) Education is measured by the average years of schooling, excluding 
post-secondary schooling, of the population age 15 to 64. High 
education is defined here as more than 3.5 years; low education, 3.5 
years or less. 
c) Five-year increase (above or below the median). 
d) Investment rate as a share of GDP (above or below the median). 
Source: For foreign exchange premium, International Currency Analysis, Inc., 
various years. For all other variables, World Bank data. 
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in public spending or an insufficient tax effort. The losses of ineffi- 
cient state enterprises are often a main contributor to excessive 
spending - whether it occurs through direct budgetary transfers to 
keep them afloat or through unrepaid loans from state-influenced 
financial institutions. Therefore, reforms of the state enterprised 
(such as liquidation of state marketing boards and privatization of 
public enterprises) are often crucial to fiscal stability. Equally impor- 
tant is making the financial system commercially viable and de-linking 
it from the government's "soft'' budget. 
When governments run large budget deficits, they absorb do- 
mestic saving and foreign funds, crowd out productive investments 
by farmers, entrepreneurs, and larger businesses, and place the 
financial system under great strain. Often too, large deficits induce 
rapid inflation, which in turn exacerbates the deficit, creating a 
vicious cycle. Deficits also lead to overvalued exchange rates that 
stifle exports, damage domestic producers, and create pressures for 
protection. Consider what happened in Indonesia and India in the 
late 1980s. Indonesia had deficits of around 2.5 percent of GDP and 
enjoyed stable, rapid growth. In India the deficit grew to nearly 10 
percent of GDP, and the country bore the consequences in lost 
competitiveness, reduced investment, and slower growth. 
If large, persistent government budget deficits are the surest 
route to economic failure, government policies that produce an 
overvalued exchange rate will put a country on the same road almost 
as quickly. Overvaluation leads inevitably to the rationing of foreign 
exchange, which historically has meant that those in government 
and their friends skim off large rents. Overvaluation creates pressure 
for layer after layer of controls on imports, capital flows, and even 
travel. And it destroys emerging export industries, perhaps the most 
important foundation for growth for any developing country. 
There is an easy and reliable way to identify unrealistic ex- 
change rate policies: compare the official rate with the parallel 
market rate. When the spread is wide, statistical studies demon- 
strate, growth slows, returns on investment decline, and the prospect 
of financial crisis and capital flight increase. It is a myth that a strong 
currency makes for a strong economy - the opposite is more nearly 
the truth. The successful East Asian economies built their growth on 
the export expansion created by depreciated real exchange rates. 
China, whose manufactured exports now exceed India's by a factor 
of more than 3, is a good example. 
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Critical Public Investments 
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How wisely a government invests in infrastructure and in peo- 
ple makes a critical difference for development. Governments that 
spread themselves too thinly neglect the tasks that only they can 
perform. The classic pattern is over-investment in new physical 
facilities and under-investment in repair and maintenance. Experi- 
ence suggests that governments stay out of the production business, 
as many in East Asia have, provide more effectively for schooling 
and health care and create better infrastructure foundations for 
private business. 
Small amounts of public investment in key sectors can make a 
huge difference. In many countries, government outlays in agricul- 
ture favour vast amounts of fertilizer subsidies, while small-scale 
irrigation schemes - often more than 80 percent cheaper than large 
ones - are neglected. So also are the basic tasks of agricultural 
research and extension. 
Human investments are especially important. One of the great- 
est threats to the of low-income countries' future is the neglect of 
investments in basic health and primary education. The infant mor- 
tality rate in India is still nearly 100 per 1,000 live births, twice the 
rate in middle-income countries. Half the children in Pakistan do not 
enrol to primary school, compared to full enrolment in middle- 
income countries. But income is not the only reason social 
development lags; public policy makes a difference too. Sri Lanka 
and Guinea have the same income, but infant mortality is seven 
times as high in Guinea. Brazil and Uruguay have similar incomes, 
but people live seven years longer on average in Uruguay. 
WHAT THE MARKET MUST BE ALLOWED TO DO 
In practice, most governments have not performed adequately 
in the above-mentioned areas, where they have a legitimate role to 
play. Instead, they have been involved in a host of other spheres 
where the market would have played the lead role. In the process, 
they spread themselves too thinly, as a result, performed ineffi- 
ciently, and also prevented the private sector from becoming the 
engine of growth. Governments need to do less in areas where 
markets work, or can be made to work, reasonably well. That 
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means many countries need to deregulate and liberalize markets, 
and privatize many of the state-owned enterprises. 
Domestic and External Liberalization 
A permissive rather than a restrictive environment is essential 
for the private sector to flourish. The great debate over economic 
systems is over. Almost everyone agrees that communism is the 
longest way from capitalism to capitalism. For all their faults, com- 
petitive markets are the best way people have yet found to get goods 
and services produced and distributed efficiently. 
What does creating a permissive environment for the private 
sector mean? For one, it means avoiding government monopsonies 
or punitive regulations. Examples of costly restrictions at various 
times include Argentina's policy of favouring incumbent firms for 
new industrial investment, and barriers to entry and exit in Brazil, 
China, India, Kenya, Zimbabwe or the previously socialist econo- 
mies. The benefit of deregulation is evident from world wide 
experience. One example is the tremendous success attending ac- 
tions of many African governments in abolishing agricultural marketing 
boards and moving towards a realistic exchange rate. Output of a 
number of key export crops, including cocoa, cotton and rubber, has 
increased dramatically since low points reached in the mid-1980s in 
countries such as Ghana, Nigeria, and Tanzania. 
A permissive environment also means that market forces work 
freely to set prices, without price controls or large subsidies. Exam- 
ples of failed price controls are numerous. Industrial performance 
lagged in industries subjected to such controls in Brazil, Egypt, 
Indonesia, and many other countries. Fertilizer policies in Bangla- 
desh or India also show something else that is wrong with controls: 
some fortunate and well-connected farmers get all the fertilizer they 
want at low prices while less well-connected farmers find fertilizer 
much less available and more expensive. 
More generally, a permissive environment is one in which the 
government seeks to reduce rather than increase the cost of doing 
business. That means reducing tariffs and quotas on international 
trade and integrating with the global economy. Successful countries 
have promoted openness to trade, investment and ideas as a means 
to encouraging domestic producers to cut costs by introducing new 
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technologies and to develop new and better products. High levels of 
protection for domestic industry, conversely, has held development 
back by decades in many places. The effect of import competition 
on firms, for instance, in Chile and Mexico, and the effect of greater 
competition in export markets on firms in Japan and Korea confirm 
the decisive contribution to efficiency that the external economy can 
make. 
Production and Distribution 
It should not be the business of government to directly manage 
the production and distribution of private goods and services. Around 
the world, the record of public enterprise management is dismal. 
While it may be true in theory that a properly managed public 
enterprise can be as productive and efficient as a private one, the 
reality is that politics almost always intrudes and efficiency is the first 
casualty. Public enterprise managers are rarely permitted to shed 
excess labour to produce at minimum costs. And procurement is 
often treated as a way of enriching contractors and procurement 
officers rather than of producing efficiently. 
Nigeria provides almost a textbook example of what can go 
wrong when the government gets directly into the business of 
producing goods and services. Between 1973 and 1990, the Nige- 
rian public sector invested $115 billion, or just about $1,000 for 
every citizen. Yet there is no growth to show for this investment, and 
most public sector assets are operating at less than 40 percent 
capacity. The reason is that most of the investment was exorbitantly 
overpriced for what one might euphemistically call non-commercial 
reasons. Relying on the private sector to undertake major invest- 
ments could have saved Nigeria up to $80 billion over the last 18 
years since the oil boom. 
Many countries, including Argentina, Ghana, Nigeria and Tur- 
key, have initiated programs of privatization and reform of state-owned 
enterprises. Privatization has meant transferring assets to the pri- 
vate sector. Reforms of SOS's have included curtailment of their 
privileged access to the budget or credit system as well as trade and 
regulatory protection. Experience has shown that privatization is 
highly desirable as a means to achieving economic efficiency, but 
that it can be a difficult and slow process. Privatization needs to be 
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combined with a variety of market reforms, such as price liberaliza- 
tion and deregulation - and the time-consuming process of private 
sector development and institution building. 
TOUGH. CHOICES FOR DEVELOPMENT 
There is greater agreement today than at any time in recent 
memory, on the blend of actions, by the state and by the market, 
needed for successful development. This convergence of views, 
however, does not mean that all disagreements are over, or that the 
reform path to better performance is straightforward. For instance, 
there is still considerable debate about the role of the state in 
providing incentives for more rapid industrialization. In other areas, 
where the lead role of the state is clear, serious questions remain on 
how to improve the state's performance. And in areas where the 
state should clearly intervene less, political problems often constrain 
the state's ability to pull itself out the marketplace. 
Let us look more closely at the issue of industrialization and the 
role of the state and consider whether the view presented in this 
paper conforms to the remarkable success of East Asian economies. 
In other words, did the governments of these economies go further 
in protecting industries and subsidizing credits to promote industriali- 
zation than the bounds for government actions identified here? The 
answer is yes. And would the economies have done as well without 
interventions? We do not know for sure, but the answer is probably 
no. And if that is the case, does it undercut the earlier conclusion on 
the limits of state intervention? 
Not really. To show that, three features of the East Asian 
intervention deserve mention. First, the intervention was subjected 
to the market test of international competition. For example, export 
success was a key criterion for the provision of special incentives. 
Second, the intervention was flexible enough to be removed when it 
proved to be counterproductive. And third, the intervention was 
moderate to avoid undercutting price signals. So how replaceable is 
this type of intervention? Where it was put into effect as described 
above, the results were solid. But most countries were not able to 
follow these principles, and for them the interventions resulted in 
disaster. 
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But what about state activities in other areas? Does the state 
possess the capacity to effectively carry out the lead roles identified 
in the earlier sections? In many cases, people with the needed skills 
are available in the public sector, but they are misused. Redeploying 
staff from micro-managing wasteful industrial licensing schemes to 
implementing a child-feeding program for the urban poor is likely to 
have high payoffs. Moving the general manager of an obsolete state 
steel plant (which ought to be closed) to oversee a comprehensive 
road rehabilitation program will also yield benefits. Of course, public 
enterprises needs to be streamlined not only to redeploy labour, but 
also to foster development of the private sector, to reduce the waste 
in physical inputs and capital equipment, and to restore fiscal stabil- 
ity. 
Finally, does the state have the sociopolitical will to reform its 
role for development? The state's sphere of effectiveness is clearly 
not limited to economic interventions. Political and social considera- 
tions determine what states do and these have a two-way relation 
with economic policy. On one side, social and political factors can 
limit economic progress. On the other, the right economic moves 
can reverse some of the sociopolitical factors constraining develop- 
ment. 
Among the sociopolitical obstacles to development, corruption 
may be the most insidious, since it corrodes reforms for develop- 
ment, often forming a vicious cycle with political weaknesses and the 
resulting government interventions. Military expenditures can be 
another constraint, since they limit what can be spent on priority 
areas. Typically, under a fiscal austerity program, governments cut 
social expenditure while sparing military spending. Income inequal- 
ity stemming from deep-seated social disparities also limit prospects 
for reform because of the large impact reforms can have on winners 
and losers. Often, regional and ethnic disparities undercut the very 
cohesion of a country. 
All these problems can paralyse a government and make 
progress very difficult. But often, bold economic reforms go a long 
way toward correcting the basic imbalances and overcoming the 
political constraints. Together with redistributive and poverty-reduc- 




THE CHICKEN & EGG SYNDROME: 
DEVELOPMENT THEORY & 
DEVELOPMENT PRACTICE 
Barry Lesser 
The World Development Report 1991 is a review, inter alia, 
of development thinking/theory over the past four decades. Noting 
that, "Thinking on development has shifted repeatedly during the 
past forty years" (p. 4), the Report examines the changes which 
have taken place and presents what it feels to be the final "revealed 
truth" that has emerged from forty years of development experi- 
ence. In all of this, one of the important questions to ask is why 
development thinking has changed as it has and, more importantly, 
whether we can now be confident that the truth has indeed been 
revealed and if so, what that truth is. 
The Bank View 
The Report itself suggests that we have moved away from 
certain theories because they have demonstrably failed to work over 
time in the sense that the countries which have ostensibly imple- 
mented or followed these theories have failed to achieve the expected 
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results. If true, this may be a valid reason for change. But, as a basis 
for change, it is a proposition which begs three important questions: 
a) Why did we try these theories in the first place? 
b) Are the new theories any better in the sense that they derive 
from a stronger empirical base than the old ones? 
c) Is the apparent failure of the theories in fact a failure of theory 
or is it due to factors exogenous to the theory? 
The Report suggests that in fact we now "know" many things 
which we did not know before. In particular it suggests that we now 
know that: 
openness and competition are key elements to development 
success; 
technological progress is the principal explanation for produc- 
tivity differences between countries and that productivity 
differences are the key to explaining differences in growth of 
output between countries; 
government intervention in the economy will help if it is "mar- 
ket-friendly" and hurt if not; and this means that governments 
should stay out of those areas where markets work reasonably 
well; 
sound macroeconomic policy is essential to long term sustain- 
able growth; 
price distortions are a prime explanation for low growth per- 
formance; 
individual freedoms are not inconsistent with economic growth; 
people investments (education, health, etc.) are key to develop- 
ment success; 
overall, government and markets are complementary; used 
properly each will contribute to achieving the maximum rate of 
growth and development. 
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This is an interesting list of things we are supposed to know. These 
are not the only things the report suggests we know but they are 
sufficient for present purposes to explore the questions raised ear- 
lier. 
Part of what makes this list of "things we know" interesting, is 
that many of these "truths" are things which for many years 
economists and other social scientists have questioned, based in part 
on empirical observation. The technology argument, for example, 
would appear at least on the surface to discard the whole debate on 
appropriate technology and labour-intensive versus capital-intensive 
production processes. Thus, what represents "truth" may be more 
apparent to some than to others. 
The Methodology of Economics 
In economics, the test of any theory must be whether it yields 
results which accord with reality when tested against experience. If 
there is an existing body of experience which can be used for testing 
purposes, this paradigm works fine - a theory is formulated, tested 
and accepted or rejected depending on whether the tests confirm its 
conclusions/predictions. In the purest of views of this deductive 
methodology of economics, only the reality of conclusions matter; 
the reality of assumptions do not matter. In a less pure view, the 
reality of assumptions may be considered but the reality of conclu- 
sions remains paramount, i.e., a theory which is based on true 
assumptions but yields, for whatever reason, false conclusions, can 
never be accepted but one which uses false assumptions but yields 
correct conclusions, may be accepted even in the less than perfectly 
pure view. 
In this deductive paradigm, theories may originate independent 
of experience but must ultimately be tested by experience. An 
inductive paradigm, by contrast, always takes experience as a start- 
ing point; theories are developed out of an examination of this 
experience. Which has been true of development thinking or theory 
over the last forty years or so? Has theory led experience or has 
experience led theory? 
WDR 1991 suggests that theory led experience originally but 
now, with several decades of experience in hand, it is experience 
which is leading the theory. This is what, finally, has pointed us 
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down the correct path. The old theories were tested by experience 
and found wanting while the new theories have been shaped by 
experience. Or so the Bank would have us believe. 
One must realize that this does not mean that the standard 
deductive methodology of the economist has been supplanted. Rather 
it means that experience has shaped new theories which, in the 
opinion of the Bank, have been confirmed when tested in the usual 
way. 
A Critical View of the Bank Position 
What is the relevance of this discussion of economic methodol- 
ogy? There are, in fact, several points which emerge from this 
discussion which are germane to an evaluation of the paradigm of 
development theory espoused in WDR 1991. Consider: 
1. It is not correct to say that the old theories were not born out of 
experience. They were - the experience of the developed 
countries as of the end of WWII. The old theories were not 
developed in a vacuum. Their failure, if we agree they have 
failed, is partly a function of the fact that the development 
experience of European and North American countries proved 
not to be transferable without adjustment to the countries of 
Asia, Africa and Latin America. If this is true, then is there an 
equal possibility that the experience of the successes of the last 
twenty years, particularly the Asian NICs, on which much of 
the Bank's new theory rests, may prove to be not transferable 
to other developing countries? Is the validity of the assump- 
tions behind the theory being overlooked? 
2. The old theories are said to have failed based on experience 
but were they in fact ever implemented under the conditions 
assumed by the theories? This is partly a question of whether 
assumptions do matter and partly a question of whether the 
ceteris paribus assumption of all these theories has been true. 
Certainly, governments have been far less benign forces than 
the old development theory would have them be and, equally, 
they have been subject to a host of external influences which, 
unambiguously, have affected domestic economic policy and 
performance. 
Barry Lesser 45 
3. The Bank argues that experience shows the new theory to be 
true. It can be asked, however, whether all that has really been 
shown is that the old theories are false. If this is the case, then 
how do we know that this time we have it right? There are 
many who would argue that we don't know because we haven't 
proven the new theory to be true. They would argue, for one 
thing, that the evidence is not yet conclusive, even if it is 
suggestive, and that even if conclusive for the countries in- 
volved, there is little or no evidence to support the wholesale 
generalization of the same policy regime for every country. 
4. There is also a question which may be asked as to whether the 
new theory is in fact a "theory" or simply a collection of 
thoughts which, however, lack the internal consistency of a 
proper theory. If this is the case, does it matter? The answer to 
this is yes if it is to be used as a basis for generalizing to others, 
which is what the Bank has clearly been doing. 
5. The deductive methodology of economics means that eco- 
nomic theory is based on generalizations; it proceeds from the 
general to the particular. In this sense, it describes the average 
condition. Given this, the theory may never describe any 
particular situation at all. Averages are made up of some 
observations that are above average and some that are below 
average; it is only by coincidence that there any observations 
which exactly match the average. WDR 1991, however, tries 
to treat all countries the same and to prescribe the same 
general policies for all. There is a sense in which it is assuming 
that everyone, in practice, is the same as the average. 
6. One of the key assumptions of the empirical work on which 
the Bank analysis rests is that the international trade and 
financial system that is in place will remain in place. While the 
need to review the system may be acknowledged at times, the 
basic analysis takes the international order as given. In this 
context, the Bank "shows" that certain policies are most 
efficient. If the assumptions changed re the external environ- 
ment, however, some of these conclusions might/would also 
change. The question then is whether the assumptions are 
justified. In different language, is the Bank using partial equilib- 
rium analysis where general equilibrium analysis is required? 
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Or to put it differently still, is this a key assumption which does 
matter and which the failure to explicitly explore creates the 
artificial conclusion that the burden of adjustment rests exclu- 
sively with the developing countries? There is a clear basis for 
answering this question with a yes. 
7. Following on from the above discussion of averages, there is 
potentially a kind of fallacy of composition in the Bank model 
in the sense that what works for one country or a few countries 
will not necessarily work for everyone. For example, the pre- 
scription on trade regimes means, in practice, for many 
developing countries, export promotion. In turn, at least in the 
short run, this means increasing commodity exports. One 
country may well benefit from increasing its production and 
exports of, say, coffee or cocoa. But, if every producer of these 
commodities does the same thing, the price gets driven down, 
and the potential gains from the enhanced production are 
eliminated. This is at least a possible scenario. A counter- 
intuitive result is obtained because of the homogeneity 
assumption made by the Bank that everyone is the same. 
8. The Bank paradigm is one which favours market led develop- 
ment over state intervention but which also argues that poverty 
reduction and environmental integrity are equally important, 
along with growth, as elements of the development equation; 
there is an assumption/presumption that these three goals are 
complementary and yet there is no evidence offered to support 
this view nor is there any attempt to assess the record of the 
high growth, market-led economies in terms of either poverty 
reduction or environment. 
These considerations are neither definitive nor exhaustive; they are 
simply illustrative of an argument that is meant to highlight four 
principal concerns regarding the Bank's views on development 
theory as expressed in VVDR 1991: 
a) the evidence that we have finally discovered the "true" devel- 
opment paradigm is far from conclusive and the conclusion 
itself, if not wrong, is certainly premature; 
b) the implication of this paradigm that the same policies should 
apply to all, i.e., that the "truth" in terms of development is 
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universal, ignores what is unique about individual countries and 
societies and runs the serious risk of over-generalizing to the 
detriment of all players; it is moreover a conclusion without 
particular quantitative support; no one has yet proven that 
what is true for one is true for all, and there is good reason to 
believe that it is not in this case; 
c) the assumption that the existing international order is a given 
may be correct but the failure to make it explicit disguises the 
fact that the domestic policy options explored may well be 
second best and generates no support, moral or otherwise, for 
industrialized nations to shoulder a greater share of the burden 
of adjustment; 
d) the presumption that market led growth will also give us 
environmental integrity and poverty reduction (not to mention 
gender equality and improved human rights) ignores some 
potentially very important trade-offs between these elements 
of development; the Bank's terminology of "market-friendly" 
is meant to imply something short of total reliance on market 
forces but there is, nonetheless, an assumption that these 
goals can all be married without conflict in what the Bank 
paradigm clearly envisages as a market dominated system. 
Conclusion 
The thrust of these comments has been to examine some of 
the conceptual underpinnings of the development paradigm pre- 
sented by WDR 1991 and the Report's own discussion of past 
development thinking. The paradigm itself has not been examined 
in detail although a number of individual aspects of the argument 
have been commented on. Rather the bulk of the discussion has 
centred on the question of whether the Bank has proven its case 
that, on the one hand, old development thinking, which emphasized 
the role of the state, has been largely discredited and, on the other 
hand, new development thinking, which emphasizes the virtues of 
market-led development, has been proven superior. What is sug- 
gested by way of an answer to these questions here is that no 
generalizations are possible (the failure to recognize this being one of 
the weaknesses of the Bank's own position) and there is clearly 
room to question the Bank's position at least for selected countries. 
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Unquestionably, there is room to question the proposition that the 
same policy prescriptions should apply to all countries. 
For the Bank, the theoretical underpinnings for the policy 
regime it has already implemented or at least recommended in most 
developing countries under the label of structural adjustment are a 
matter of some importance. If you cannot sell the paradigm which 
lies behind structural adjustment as one which is theoretically defen- 
sible, you obviously have a problem in selling the policy of structural 
adjustment itself. Thus, it is no trivial exercise from the Bank's 
perspective to engage in the kind of review of development theory 
that is found in WDR 1991 nor, from this perspective, are the results 
surprising. 
There can be no argument with the basic proposition that 
developing countries have failed to make the progress that thirty or 
more years of development efforts should reasonably have been 
expected to produce. Nor can there be any argument with the 
proposition that things cannot go on as they have been; something 
must change. But beyond this point, there is considerable room to 
debate what must change and for what purpose. 
The Bank view is one which sees economic development and 
growth essentially as a generic process. What spells success for one 
spells success for all. But there is a sense in which this is precisely 
the view embodied in the very first development theories of the fifties 
and sixties, which used the historical experience of the developed 
countries as the basis for the theories of development expounded for 
the third world. More significantly, this universal prescription offered 
by the Bank ignores or discounts social and cultural characteristics of 
countries which do make a difference to the policies they adopt. 
There is, in a sense, a World BankAMF hegemony which has 
been established out of the structural adjustment era of the 1980s 
and 1990s. What the Bank says and does, therefore, is of utmost 
importance to the policies and practices adopted by not only devel- 
oping countries themselves but also developed country governments 
and bilateral ODA agencies in their dealings with developing coun- 
tries. Thus, when the Bank claims that market-led development has 
been "proven" superior and that a new and "true" development 
paradigm has been found at last, this is an argument that must be 
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treated seriously. More importantly, it is an argument that must be 
challenged, not because it contains no truth, but because it does not 
contain all truth. 
Part of the challenge of development is not to force everyone 
into the same mold, with the same objectives and policies, but to 
search out common values where they exist and, otherwise, to learn 
tolerance and respect for the remaining differences. Development is 
very much a value-laden concept. So too is the Bank paradigm, 
which, inter alia, accepts the value system implicit in a market based 
economy and accepts growth as the paramount objective of devel- 
opment. 
The world economy is showing an increasing trend towards 
globalization of markets, both product markets and production mar- 
kets. With this globalization, we are also seeing pressures for 
harmonization of policies between countries as capital mobility and 
job (not labour) mobility make many industries, especially service 
industries, increasingly footloose, i.e., capable of moving quickly, 
cheaply and without loss of efficiency to any of several locations, 
which may be separated by large distances. But while this trend is 
very evident amongst developed, industrialized countries, it has not 
developed naturally or on its own amongst developing countries. 
The Bank paradigm would produce (impose) this result for the 
developing world. It is a paradigm which not only treats all develop- 
ing countries the same as each other but also treats them the same 
as developed economies. 
This is questionable partly because the assumption of homoge- 
neity is questionable and partly because the policy regime involved in 
the Bank paradigm is only partly the same as the policy regime 
emerging in developed countries. One way in which the two differ is 
that there is no provision made in the Bank paradigm for changing 
the policy stance of developed countries vis-a-vis developing coun- 
tries but there is provision for the reverse. In other words, the Bank 
paradigm, although ostensibly prescribing a common policy regime 
for all countries regardless of development status, is, in fact, asym- 
metric in this very important respect. This returns us to the argument 
made earlier about the failure of WDR 1991 to explicitly consider 
changes to the international order instead of, or in addition to, 
domestic policy changes. 
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The review of development thinking in WDR 1991 and the 
presentation of the "market-friendly" paradigm have much to com- 
mend them. But they suffer from a combination of not making their 
value judgements explicit, not making their assumptions explicit or 
making assumptions which may not be warranted, and generating 
conclusions which are not yet unambiguously proven on average 
and certainly not unambiguously established as best for any particu- 
lar situation/country. The ultimate failure of WDR 1991, in this 
sense, is that it tries to do too much, to argue that there is a universal 
"development truth". If there is, it has not yet been discovered; 
certainly it is not in WDR 1991. 
INTERNATIONAL AGENCIES AND 
NATION STATES: 
DIALOGUE FOR DEVELOPMENT? 
Paul Bowles 
The theme that I wish to address in this paper is the role that 
international agencies play in the interaction between the countries 
of the North and those of the South and whether this role can be 
said to be promoting the development of the South. In undertaking 
this analysis, my aim will be to demonstrate that the process of 
North-South interaction has changed significantly over the past 30 
years and that underlying this change in process is a change in the 
assumptions about what it means to be a developing country. My 
conclusion will be that the present role played by international 
institutions does not promote the development of the South. A 
major reason for this is that the current dominant view of what it 
means to be a developing country is, in fact, theoretically and 
empirically false. The World Development Report 1991, by subscrib- 
ing and indeed promoting this view, has therefore mis-specified the 
real challenge of development and the role that international institu- 
tions can play in meeting it. 
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In order to accomplish my task, I wish to focus on two key 
words in my title, namely, "dialogue" and "development". Let me 
start first with dialogue and analyze how the process of North-South 
interaction has changed. A brief historical note is useful here because 
it enables us to focus on change. Furthermore, a historical approach 
also enables us to see that underlying the changing nature of North- 
South dialogue are crucial assumptions about the structure of the 
international economy and, hence, our understanding of develop- 
ment. 
During the 1960s and 1970s, the newly emergent post-colo- 
nial states of the South met as a group to negotiate with the 
countries of the North under the auspices of UNCTAD - the United 
Nations Conference on Trade and Development. It is true that this 
acronym also became known by some wags as Under No Circum- 
stances Take a Decision, but, whatever the verdict on the importance 
of the results of this process, it was premised on the need for a 
forum for North-South negotiation. Under the auspices of UNCTAD, 
such issues as a code of conduct for multinational corporations, the 
volume of aid flows and the basis for a New International Economic 
Order were raised. The rationale for considering these issues was 
that international economic relations were seen as favouring the 
countries of the North. This bias resulted from, among other things, 
the North's monopoly of advanced technology, the oligopoly power 
of its corporations which dominate world trade and the declining 
terms of trade which acted to the disadvantage of the primary 
commodity exporting South. Under these circumstances, the market 
mechanism, left to itself, would not distribute the fruits of growth 
evenly. The role of international institutions such as UNCTAD, 
therefore, was to constrain market forces, mediate North-South 
disputes, and rectify unjust outcomes. 
The purpose of this brief historical sketch is not to hark back to 
some "Golden Age" of development or to claim that international 
institutions met with much success in their endeavours. Rather, what 
is worth remembering is the nature of the process of North-South 
interaction and the underlying view of the international economy 
which laid the basis for such a process. 
The process sketched above provides a sharp contrast with the 
structure of North-South relations today. Now the most important 
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forum for the discussion of trade issues is the GATT - a forum in 
which developing countries have little say and where the main 
decisions and bargains are made by the U.S., the Europeans and 
Japan. The World Bank, furthermore, has moved to centre stage as 
being the international agency having the greatest impact on devel- 
oping countries. In fact, the Bank along with the IMF, has become 
the major channel through which North-South economic interac- 
tions take place; UNCTAD is moribund and searching for a new role 
while the United States Nations Centre on Transnational Corpora- 
tions has been abolished. 
It is important to note, however, that not only have the players 
changed but so has the process. The South is no longer represented 
as a group, but the Bank and the IMF deal with developing countries 
on a case by case basis. 
Why has this change of process come about? There are a 
number of possible explanations here. One is that the development 
experience of the past 30 years has varied greatly from country to 
country with some countries, notably in East Asia, doing very well 
whilst others, for example, those in sub-Saharan Africa, have per- 
formed poorly. The result of this has been that the coherence of the 
term the "South" has been lost and there is no longer a set of 
common interests which these countries share. Or perhaps it is that 
multinational corporations have not proved to be the ogres that they 
were once thought to be and that the rise of developing country 
manufactured exports has made the terms of trade debate less 
relevant. 
There is some truth in these explanations although multina- 
tionals are even more dominant in world trade and investment and 
the bulk of developing country manufacturing exports come from a 
handful of countries. There are also some other important factors at 
play. Here we might think of the debt crisis which has forced many 
countries to abandon long term visions of changing the structure of 
the world economy and concentrate on acquiring short term finan- 
cial assistance. The South with debts to the North of some US$ 20 
trillion and annual net outflows to the North of US$ 50 billion is in 
no position to challenge the existing order. We might also refer to 
the end of the Cold War during the 1980s which robbed the South of 
one of its major bargaining chips, namely, the threat of defection to 
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the socialist camp. With this threat gone, the North no longer has to 
address the concerns of the South as a group. 
The change in players and the movement of the World Banff, 
and the IMF to centre stage also deserves comment. In the 1980s 
there was a decisive shift in power towards capital in the countries of 
the North, as well as a rapid globalisation of capital. Agencies which 
preach liberalisation, the opening up of markets and the free move- 
ment of capital are likely to be the beneficiaries of these trends. 
Living as we do in an era of unprecedented bourgeois hegemony, it 
is easy to forget that the world has not also been this way and will 
not remain unchanged in the future. 
It is perhaps surprising that the World Bank is so powerful, in 
view of the fact that net resource transfers have been relatively low 
during the 1980s and that by the end of the decade the Bank was 
actually receiving more in financial inflows from developing countries 
than it lent to them. Far from being a development lending agency, 
the Bank was taking in more money from developing countries than 
it was lending out; a situation which might be expected to reduce its 
importance to borrowing countries. However, the World Bank is no 
ordinary bank; its shareholders are the major industrial countries 
and its largest contributor the United States. This means that its 
power is not proxied by the profits which it makes but by the 
international context within which it operates. 
In the 1960s and 1970s, the countries of the North and South 
met in forums such as UNCTAD to "negotiate". Now individual 
countries meet with the Bank and the IMF to undertake "policy 
dialogue". Dialogue presupposes a basic equality between the two 
participants; if one is in a much stronger position than the other 
then it is not so much dialogue as instructions. The changes in the 
international environment in the 1980s, to which I have referred 
above, suggest, I think, that the prospects for a genuine dialogue are 
slim. This does not, of course, mean that whatever the Bank says, 
or even whatever developing countries agree to do as part of struc- 
tural adjustment programmes, for example, will necessarily be 
implemented. It is nevertheless clear who has the power in the 
relationship. 
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The changed process of North-South relations mirrors a change 
in the identification of what problems developing countries face. The 
World Bank deals with countries on an individual basis on the 
grounds that the international environment is given and that the 
major focus should be on internal reforms in order to position the 
country advantageously within this international economy; all devel- 
oping countries are faced by the same external circumstances but 
some still do better than others. Therefore, the argument nuns, the 
different outcomes must be the result of different internal policies. 
So, turning to the second key word of my title, does the new agenda 
encourage development? 
A number of issues immediately suggest themselves. First is the 
question of what we mean by "development". This is, of course, an 
old question, but one worth asking often and one which has received 
fresh relevance in the light of the different emphases given in the 
World Bank's World Development Report with its emphasis on 
economic indicators and the UN's Human Development Report 
which places more emphasis on social indicators. 
A second issue concerns the whole experience of structural 
adjustment programmes. Structural adjustment loans account for 
around 25 percent of total World Bank lending and there is now a 
substantial literature which has been critical of structural adjustment 
programmes (see, for example, the work of another international 
institution, UNICEF, presented in Cornia, Jolly and Stewart (eds.) 
Adjustment with a Human Face). Some critics have focused on the 
effects of the programmes on so-called vulnerable groups such as 
women and children, whilst others have pointed to the environmen- 
tal consequences of encouraging cash crop production and 
agro-forestry exports. 
These issues, the meaning of development and the efficacy of 
structural adjustment programmes, are important topics but here I 
want to raise a few other points. Before doing so, however, let me 
make clear that the case that I am going to argue does not mean that 
internal reforms in developing countries are not necessary. Many 
developing countries are characterised by great inequalities in access 
to resources and to political power; my point is not that developing 
countries are beyond criticism. Rather, my point is that the case for 
liberalisation is a mistaken panacea. 
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The 1991 Development Report is premised on the need for 
developing countries to adopt "market friendly" policies. Markets, it 
is argued, should be left to achieve a (static) efficient allocation of 
resources and this, combined with government provision of educa- 
tion, infrastructure and legal system, will promote dynamic efficiency 
(i.e. growth). Thus, countries should produce according to their 
comparative advantage (even, apparently, if they have a comparative 
advantage in being host to polluting industries) and integrate into the 
international economy on these terms. This will not only allocate 
resources efficiently now (domestically and internationally), but the 
stimuli provided by international competition will ensure that invest- 
ment resources are also allocated efficiently and that, therefore, 
future growth is maximised. 
In assessing this view of development and its policy prescrip- 
tions, I will focus on two points: what does this term "market 
friendly" mean; and, is the free market approach to development 
theoretically and empirically valid? 
The term "market friendly" represents, on a charitable reading, 
a wonderful sleight of hand or, on a more critical reading, a deliber- 
ate obfuscation designed to deceive. "Market friendly" appears to 
indicate a direction of change - towards the market allocation of 
resources. However, it also implicitly suggests the desirable end 
state. Since friendship is presumably a good thing, then the more 
friendly you are to the market presumably the better the outcome 
i.e. a free market allocation of resources is optimal. This is left 
implicit because, as the Bank recognises, those economies of East 
Asia which have done spectacularly well, at least in growth terms, in 
the past 25 years have done so by using government actively in the 
economic sphere (of which more below). But to have suggested that 
what was required was to emulate their "guided markets" or "gov- 
erned markets" would have left the door open for a role for 
government in the productive sector and some countries might have 
got the wrong idea and thought that government intervention of 
some types was alright. Better, therefore, to imply the desirability of 
markets by a term like "market friendly", which can always be 
defended as a direction of change if pushed! 
Furthermore, even if one accepts the need to move in the 
direction of the market, the relationship between markets and own- 
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ership is not adequately explored. The implied position is that 
markets are only really compatible with private ownership; thus 
"market friendly" becomes "private ownership friendly". The Bank's 
view is that markets require both competition and private ownership 
to work effectively; the evidence for this proposition is scanty. 
Nowhere is the deliberate obfuscation implied by the term 
market friendly more evident than in the Bank's attempt to lay claim 
to China's recent economic success. China has experienced rapid 
growth and doubled per capita output between 1978 and 1988; one 
of the shortest times in human history that such a record has been 
achieved. China has achieved such a record by moving away from a 
centrally planned economy and introducing market reforms. How- 
ever, social ownership is still dominant with the state and collectively 
owned sectors producing more than 90 percent of total industrial 
output. Furthermore, significant state planning still exists, price 
controls are widely used, and there is no real "labour market". In 
short, China's success has been achieved in an economy in which 
market, planning and social ownership have all been in evidence. 
The Chinese economy is certainly very far from the free market 
economy which the Bank promotes and to suggest otherwise, by 
using the ambiguous term market friendly to describe the Chinese 
economy, is a deception. 
A final point on market friendly. It is implied that it pays to be 
market friendly in all circumstances and no allowance is made for 
any second best outcomes. This is particularly relevant at present 
since the countries of the North became more protectionist in the 
1980s. Given this, does it follow that it is always best for the 
countries of the South to liberalise their economies? 
Let me move on to the view of development which the free 
market paradigm, as supported by the Bank, presents and assess 
the theoretical basis and empirical basis for this. The Bank's analysis 
implies that all countries are, for economic purposes, the same. A 
developing country is simply a poor country not one that has a 
structurally different relationship to the world economy than devel- 
oped countries. Countries may differ in terms of resources 
endowments, income per head, etc., but there is nothing particularly 
different, from an economic point of view, about developing coun- 
tries. They are subject to exactly the same economic laws as developed 
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countries. Specifically, it implies that there is nothing exceptional in 
being, or attempting to become, a "late industrialiser''; there are no 
distinct policies which must be followed because development is 
taking place in the context of a world which is now characterized by 
large technological gaps, increasingly mobile international capital 
and a global competitive market. Developing countries are defined 
by their GNP per capita, rather than by their relationship to the 
world economy. This is a significant departure from the premises of 
the 1960s and 1970s. 
Is it the case that developing countries are structurally similar to 
developed countries or do they face particular problems, which 
therefore require special policies, as a result of their position in the 
world economy? The free market paradigm, as we have seen, 
suggests that developing countries do not face theoretically distinct 
problems; the theory of "late industrialisation" suggests otherwise. 
. 
The theory of "late industrialisation" views the state's interven- 
tion in the development process as a crucial factor. This theory has a 
long history going back to debates about how Germany, Russia and 
the United States overcame the disadvantages of backwardness in 
the 19th century to compete with Britain; perhaps its most well 
known exponent being Gerschenkron. This theory has received 
further recent exposition from Amsden. For Amsden, the significant 
feature of those economies that have successfully industrialised in 
the Twentieth century is that they have done so by learning. In a 
world where over 95 percent of Research and Development takes 
place in developed countries, the ability of developing countries to 
compete on the basis of innovation is severely curtailed. However, 
competing on the basis of cheap labour alone is also problematic 
and unlikely to lead to sustained growth; what is needed therefore is 
the ability of developing country industry to learn. This contrasts 
with the first industrial nation, Britain, which gained preeminence 
through invention and the Nineteenth century industrialisers who did 
so on the basis of innovation. Amsden argues, therefore, that the 
large technological gap which exists between rich and poor countries 
in the Twentieth century can only be closed if the poor countries 
create the institutions enabling them to learn. The state, always an 
important actor in the growth process, is a central institution for late 
industrialisers. Amsden writes: 
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To catch up in the twentieth century has required still heavier 
doses of government support because backwardness has been 
relatively greater ...Not only have states in late industrialising 
countries intervened by protecting infant industries. They have 
also intervened by providing private investors with a battery of 
incentives that, simplified, boil down to subsidies. The tariff 
epitomizes the age of infant industry protection. The subsidy, 
which includes tariff protection and financial incentives, epito- 
mizes the struggle to industrialize after the Second World War... 
...The state in late industrialisation has intervened to address 
the needs of both savers and investors, and of both exporters 
and importers, by creating multiple prices. Some interest rates 
are higher than others. Importers and exporters face different 
prices for foreign currency. Insofar as the state in late industri- 
alization has intervened to establish multiple prices in the same 
market, the state cannot be said to have gotten relative prices 
"right", as dictated by supply and demand. In fact, the state in 
late industrialization has set relative prices deliberately `wrong' 
in order to create profitable investment opportunities (Amsden 
1989, pp. 13-14). 
The conflicting demands placed upon the economic system of 
late industrialisers requires that an active state intervene to mitigate 
these conflicts. Instead of exposing the economy to the full force of 
international market forces, the state mediates and tempers these 
forces and protects and fosters its own learning industries. Identify- 
ing which industries and sectors to promote is a relatively manageable 
task for late industrialisers. As Wade writes with respect to Taiwan, 
"the fact that Taiwan has not been near any world technology 
frontier until very recently make the selection of `winners' easier 
than for more advanced countries" (1990, p. 189). Far from `getting 
prices right', a key element in the state's armoury to support such 
targeted industries has been the subsidy. 
Thus, the state plays the crucial role of entrepreneur in late 
industrialisation, directs resources to target sectors and fosters indus- 
trial development through subsidies and shields the economy from 
the ravages of international market competition. The reason why 
state intervention was necessary is precisely because market forces, 
far from being friendly to developing countries, can be destructive; 
the market destroys not protects the weak and late industrialising 
countries have therefore had to temper the operation of market 
forces and to use them selectively. 
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Empirical support for this theory comes from two of the most 
successful "late industrialisers", namely, South Korea and Taiwan. 
These countries (and before them Japan) have achieved their eco- 
nomic success by directly intervening in the market, by tightly 
controlling the financial system, by directing credit to specific sectors, 
by using selective import controls and export promotion measures, 
and by having active industrial and technology policies. The remark- 
able economic performance of the two East Asian economies, 
therefore, does not owe its success to the application of free market 
principles and adherence to the static concept of comparative advan- 
tage; in many ways, they created their comparative advantage. 
The Bank sometimes recognises that the success of Taiwan 
and South Korea did not result from the application of neoclassical 
economic principles, but still does not advocate interventionism 
elsewhere. Rather, the Bank tries to square the circle by arguing that 
although the East Asian countries were successful in using interven- 
tionist policies, other countries do not have the capacity or 
commitment to intervene to the same effect. For them, it is argued, 
the non-interventionist route is the most appropriate. This, how- 
ever, is a non sequitur. 
It is perfectly true that the East Asian "model" is not capable of 
being universally replicated but this is not simply a matter of insuffi- 
cient "technical expertise". In part, the non-replicability arises because 
of the internal structure of the East Asian economies which enabled 
a relatively autonomous state to discipline capital in return for 
subsidies. The same state structures, and class compositions of the 
state, do not occur in many other developing countries. 
However, another crucial difference is in the external condi- 
tions. The East Asian countries were uniquely positioned within the 
international economy because of their strategic significance in the 
Cold War. This gave them privileged access to U.S. financial re- 
sources and export markets at crucial points in their development. 
The American support at no point resembled a blank cheque but it is 
clear that these countries were favoured in their trading relations 
with the U.S. - a favour which they exploited to the full. 
The account of the basis of the East Asian countries' success 
offered here means that the World Bank's position is robbed of its 
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foundations on two counts. Firstly, these countries did not use the 
free market internally to promote their development. Secondly, 
external conditions played a critical part in determining their success. 
The fact that other developing countries do not face such favourable 
external circumstances means that for the East Asian model to be 
generalised a necessary condition is that the external environment 
itself must change. 
It is here that an important role for international institutions 
exists and the challenge of development is to fashion the institutions 
and policies capable of giving all developing countries the same 
external chances that the East Asian countries had. 
It should be the role of international institutions to constrain 
international market forces and carve out for developing countries 
the room to manoeuvre which they so manifestly require. The 
unleashing of market forces in the South will not favour those at the 
bottom of the international pecking order no matter how much 
those at the top stand to gain. 
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The two most important features in aid over the last ten years 
- a period which has seen official development assistance increase 
from $37.8 bn in 1980 to $62.6 bn in current values - have been the 
abandonment of projects in favour of programs, and a conflict 
between aid for growth and aid for development. In both cases, 
because of its central position within the aid system, the IBRD has 
been in the forefront. This role has less to do with the total value of 
its disbursements than its predominant policy leadership. The Devel- 
opment Assistance Committee (DAC) reports that International 
Financial Institutions (IFIs), which include the World Bank Group, 
accounted for no more than 9 percent of total resource flows from 
developed to developing countries and they: 
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...in addition to being funding institutions, have important cata- 
lytic effects on other official and private sources and play a 
central role in policy advice as well as transfer of management 
skills in the largest sense.' 
The Bank's concentration on comprehensive programs, consistent 
with its findings in the World Development Report, increases this 
influence, which, when taken together with donor fatigue - a combi- 
nation of declining political support, uncertain results and trade 
myopia - provide it with a preeminent place in defining the re- 
sponses of industrial countries to development issues. 
Background 
Information and ideas about aid are coordinated through the 
Development Assistance Committee of the OECD. Most official 
development aid is provided by the industrial countries which consti- 
tute its membership.2 The reduction of oil producers' surpluses 
together with the demise of the Soviet Union have left developing 
countries with few alternatives.3 Non DAC countries net disburse- 
ments amounted to $9,969 mn (US $) in 1990 or 20 percent of 
DAC's net disbursements. This total reversed a trend, principally 
because of the Gulf War, and demonstrated that aid is provided as 
much for political as developmental reasons. Official development 
assistance is principally an issue involving the industrial market 
economies - directly through bilateral aid or as subscribers to the 
World Bank Group and supporters of the UN system - and the aid 
recipients, the developing countries which are listed in Table 5.5. 
DAC members are required to follow common rules, for example 
distinguishing aid from trade concessions (which are loose enough), 
and their common policy orientation which is increasingly respon- 
sive to policy ideas of their Finance Ministries and the World Bank. 
Total Resource Flows 
Development assistance is only one portion of the total re- 
source flows from industrial to developing countries. Changes in the 
composition of the total resource flows are important in order to 
understand the increasing weight of foreign aid (or overseas develop- 
ment assistance) and to appreciate the difficulties facing recipients. 
Total resource flows are divided into Official Development Finance 
(composed of Official Development Assistance and other Official 
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Development Finance); export credits; and private flows, which have 
five components, including direct foreign investment and bank lend- 
ing. It is the relationship between ODA and private flows which are 
the most important. 
At first sight, total resource flows appear satisfactory, increas- 
ing from $128.3 bn (1980) to $144.2 bn (1990) in current dollars 
(US); but when calculated in 1989 dollars, the figures show a decline 
from $179.4 bn to $128.9 bn. Moreover, official development aid, 
when compared with private flows, is now more, not less, important 
to developing countries (see Table 5.1); and within ODA, multilateral 
disbursements declined in 1989. The choice of these two dates 
disguises rather than illuminates the changes during the decade, for 
between 1982 and 1989, disbursements fell below their 1980 figure 
of $128 bn reaching a trough of $81.8 bn in 1986. 
Table 5.1 
Total Resource Flows to Developing Countries 
(current $bn) 
1980 1990 % 1980 1990 
I Official Development Finance 45.6 78.8 35.5 54.6 
(a) ODA 37.8 62.6 29.5 43.4 
(b) ODF 7.8 16.2 6.1 11.2 
II Total Export Credits 16.5 4.6 12.9 3.2 
III Private Flows 66.2 60.8 51.6 42.2 
(a) Direct Investment 11.2 32.0 8.7 22.2 
(b) International Bank Lending 49.0 18.5 38.2 12.8 
which is short term 26.0 - 20.3 - 
(c) Total Bond Lending 1.6 0.8 1.2 0.6 
(d) Other Private 2.0 5.0 1.6 3.5 
(e) NGO Grants 2.4 4.5 1.9 - 
Total Net Resource Flows (1+11+111) 128.3 144.2 100.0 100.0 
Source: Development Co-operation, (1991), T. V1-1, p. 113. 
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The first discussion point is: how can total resources for 
developing countries be increased? 
Total resource flows will either come from a growth in the 
proportion of ODA or direct foreign investment, the latter being the 
largest component of private resource flows. The Bank's calcula- 
tions, using slightly different figures, show that net resource flows to 
developing countries are estimated to increase from US $63.3 bn 
(1989) to $103 bn in 1995, of which private flows grew the most 
rapidly from $26.7 bn to an estimated $47 bn; and direct foreign 
investment will form 75 percent in 1995.4 The Bank is assuming 
renewed industrial country flows in all categories with an emphasis 
on the `compensation principle' - the replacement of aid by private 
investment. 
How realistic is this assessment? What does it mean when aid - 
even at today's admittedly inadequate levels - is compensated by 
direct foreign investment flows? The following Table compares direct 
foreign investment as a percentage of aid received in 1989 by listing 
the number of countries in which DFI is greater than aid, and 
therefore are currently fully compensated; countries which are `prob- 
ably compensated' (their current DFI is over 75 percent of official 
development assistance); and `potentially compensated' (between 
50-74 percent). Only 21 countries of the 100 low and middle income 
countries fall into the three categories. 
Table 5.2 
Aid and Direct Foreign Investment 
Aid Level 
DR 100 + DR 75 + DR 50 + 
(US $ mn) 
500+ 2 - 1 
250 - 499 1 - 1 
100 - 249 5 2 3 
100- 5 1 - 
Total $2,906(13) $320(3) $1,743(5) 
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Although the exercise is static and based on the assumption 
that the lack of official development aid can be replaced without 
effecting growth, which is in itself an unlikely possibility, the Table 
forces us to recognize that the replacement - or even something 
near it - of ODA by DFI will be at best highly selective and at worst, 
punitive.5 There are only two low income countries (Angola and 
Myanmar) in the above Table and both could well be abberations 
because of the chosen year. In sum, both aid and private flows must 
increase for developing countries to grow. 
Programs for Growth 
If we agree that resources should grow (total resource flows are 
about 24 percent of the developing country exports) and we assume 
that private and official flows are unlikely to increase, how should 
development assistance best be used? 
The Report comments: 
Because of the impact of the debt crisis on private sector 
lending to the developed world, bilateral and multilateral grants 
and loans will most likely contribute more than half of all 
resource flows to developing countries in the 1990s. An ad- 
equate volume of these flows is therefore crucial. The quality of 
these flows could be raised through increased co-ordination 
among aid and finance agencies; more effective support for 
market oriented policy measures (providing greater support for 
fewer but more ambitious reforms); stronger emphasis on 
supporting private sector initiatives; greater attention to envi- 
ronmental policies; and features that "insure" debt creating 
flows against price and interest rate volatility (p. 150). 
If total resource flows are insufficient then the Bank's pragma- 
tism becomes more acceptable and aid should target developing 
countries to support their credit-worthiness with the aim of becom- 
ing attractive to investors. So, the most useful (and important) 
objective for ODA is to encourage other resource flows, particularly 
direct foreign investment; for this to occur, aid should concentrate on 
improving the investment climate and strongly support private sector 
activities. 
A second question, closely related to the first, is: should devel- 
opment assistance be used to encourage private resource flows 
as a long term solution for developing countries? 
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There must be a concern in using aid, a scarce commodity, 
when there are other, and potentially easier, ways to increase 
resource flows. The first is the issue of trade barriers, and particularly 
agricultural trade barriers, which are analytically (although admittedly 
not practically) independent of the ability of developing countries to 
take advantage of markets. Unless industrial countries practice trade 
reform and the move to implicit or explicit trading blocs are removed, 
only a select few developing countries will be able to take advantage 
of renewed world growth.' Further, and with potentially greater 
short term impact, there is the continuing presence of the debt. The 
Report demonstrates the increasing damage of high interest pay- 
ments to the developing countries' economic performance and its 
impact through transfers; not only are net transfers, when com- 
pared to resource flows, negative - an absurd situation by which 
developing countries have returned more than they have received7- 
but interest payments have had a counterproductive effect on trade 
performance. There were only 11 countries in 1989, out of 100 
developing countries, with a positive balance of payments position 
(increasing to 14 if official transfers are included) and more than 41 
countries had a debt service to export ratio over 20 percent; 22 had 
a ratio of over 30 percent. A reduction in debt service (principal and 
interest repayments on long term debt) by ten percent would equal 
aid flows (developing country exports amount to $516,460 mn 
compared to aid flows of about $48 mn) and presumably increase 
exports from industrial countries. External debt may be a "complex 
brew" but it surely contains the potion of growth. 
Aid for Growth or Development? 
If we equate market support programs as encouraging develop- 
ing country growth (with the promise that increasing wealth is a 
condition of development) and investing in people (support for 
health, education and general living conditions) a key development 
function, then the World Development Report reflects an ambigu- 
ity which is not easily reconciled. Market friendly measures are 
increasingly the result of finance for policy measures (price incen- 
tives, exchange rate adjustments, and trade liberalization); measures 
which depend for their success on factors which neither the Bank 
nor the majority of countries have much control. Although program 
lending has been growing as a proportion of total aid and accounted 
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for 13.3 percent of total bilateral and 5.7 percent of multilateral aid, 
it is not clear if these programs have been successful. The WDR 
admits that the indicators pointing to the success of adjustment 
programs are not "straightforward" and that, in particular, the social 
adjustment component shows "no clear relation between adjust- 
ment and changes in employment or social indicators. "8 Other 
Bank publications are more forthright noting that "about 60 percent 
of all conditions in structural adjustment loans and sectoral adjust- 
ment loans were implemented fully or more than fully" while admitting 
that there was "great variation" in implementation. Accepting that 
adjustment programs are difficult to judge or implement, it is interest- 
ing to note that the Bank's solution, or future directions,9 emphasise 
prerequisites and ensuring that the key conditions are met before the 
loans are fully activated. In other words, adjustment loans will be 
provided when there is agreement about the causes and not simply 
the problem. It is important to recall that program lending is often a 
qualification for other Bank supported loans and bilateral support. 
Policy co-ordination may result in donor efficiency but it can lead to 
an unfortunate consensus which may be less the result of wisdom 
than a combination of self assurance and self protection. 
The increasing support for program lending can be compared 
to education loans, which the Report regards, correctly, as a value in 
itself. In 1990, bilateral support for education amounted to 11.5 
percent of bilateral agency disbursements and 4.6 percent of total 
disbursements of multilateral agencies in 1990. If education is so 
important, should it not be treated as valuable as loans and interest 
repayment? If health and other social programs are added to 
education, social expenditures amount to 22.8 and 17.8 percent for 
bilateral and multilateral disbursements, respectively. There is little 
consistency in earmarking this essential growth element. 
The next question must be: should investments in people be 
treated independently (perhaps autonomously) from short term 
growth or stabilization programs? 
The value of a donor consensus which protects social rights not 
only increases social equity but protects the weakest who most 
deserve support, especially in vulnerable economies that depend on 
aid to function or perhaps survive. Table 5.3 summarizes informa- 
tion found in Table 5.4 (p. 80); it discriminates countries by the value 
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of aid flows to the total value of goods and services (the Gross 
Domestic Product) and then rank orders them by the degree of aid 
dependence. A similar calculation, using World Bank data, is pre- 
sented for comparison as Table 5.5 (pp. 81-83). 
Table 5.3 
Aid Dependency, 1989 
Aid Category Countries 
Aid Value 
(US $ mn) 
percent 
Highly 
Dependent (20 +) 
14 3,736 12 
Dependent (10) 25 7,089 21 
Influenced (5-9) 16 6,116 18 
Other 95 16,950 49 
Total 160 34,120 100 
Source: see Table 5.4 (p. 80). 
Highly aid dependent countries, for example, receive the equivalent 
of 20 percent plus of the value of their GDP; aid dependent, between 
10 and 20; and aid influenced, between 5 and 9.9 percent of GDP. 
These countries urgently need aid to maintain their economies on 
which donor agencies, and the World Bank, have a major influence 
(not to say considerable power) over. If there is any set of countries 
where donor influence should prevail, it is the categories of highly 
and dependent aid recipients. Yet, donor sponsored social invest- 
ments make up a very small percentage of their total aid flows. As 
Table 5.4 shows, only 12 of the 57 countries receive more than 20 
percent of their social investment expenditures from donors. 
Therefore: should donor countries ensure that a fixed pro- 
portion of their funds is disbursed for social programs? Should 
we work for a reverse conditionality? 
In this case, donors would take a relatively aggressive stand; 
social commitments to recipients would be key for continued aid 
flows. Agreements would and could be reached less about economic 
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management and more about social management. If aid depend- 
ency continues, and there is little optimism that world economic 
growth or policy reform can easily reduce the need of official devel- 
opment assistance to aid dependent countries, donors and recipients 
should act on the weight of evidence regarding social programs and 
negotiate around these development criteria rather than purely fi- 
nancial and policy matters. At a time when the trend is downward, 
there is a strong case, found in this report, for massive educational 
adjustment.10 A discussion between donors and recipients regarding 
social programs, on the basis of social rights, is preferable and more 
straightforward than the current concern, again found in the Report, 
regarding the tricky issue of governance. 
Effective policy making, the Bank argues, can only come with 
institutional restructuring and state reform; these changes, which 
require "political courage and economic vision" are expected to lead 
to better government and better decisions. Few can deny that institu- 
tional robbery - in both developed and industrial countries - in favour 
of the rich and powerful is a moral offense if the poor suffer. The 
Report assumes that the creation of a framework of opportunities 
by which agents can exercise their rational self interest is an ad- 
equate guardian of economic as well as political and social rights. 
Moreover, it proposes -and here it makes a further appeal to aid 
coordination - that institutional and policy reform rather than finan- 
cial criteria alone become the new zone for donor conditionality. To 
quote: 
In countries that are not paralysed by political forces, and 
where reforms can go forward, the task for external aid and 
financial agencies is to promote it. They can do this by avoiding 
support for unproductive activities or for new products that 
would be implemented under severely distorted conditions. In 
many countries, external agencies must help to strengthen the 
public institutions without which development assistance is 
likely to be ineffectual.'' 
Thus, external aid agencies, given the number of aid dependent 
countries, become arbiters. The historical record is not a positive 
one because today's reforms often become tomorrow's errors - 
pace large dams; or consider the record of the donor agencies 
regarding environmental costs. Further, even if there is a verbal 
consensus regarding the present value of the environment princi- 
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pally to industrial countries - where most of the pollution originates - 
it is not clear that the same concern is shared by resource rich 
developing countries (e.g. Malaysia and Brazil). Moreover, there is a 
logical - not to say political - difficulty in making governance or 
institutional reform the new conditionality; can you order a country 
to be democratic? 
Donor agencies should follow the logic of their research and 
provide funds for social development - and they should do it both 
indirectly and directly. Indirectly, by matching funds to recipient 
governments' social expenditures, and directly to educational institu- 
tions, by, for example, earmarking funds for NGOs in developing 
countries. If long term growth is based on human resource develop- 
ment, then policies should acknowledge that as people become 
more knowledgeable, they demand greater rights - a valuable if 
difficult by-product of global communication - so that educational 
expenditures, per family, increase as much as consumer goods as 
per capita income grows. CIDA's WID policy-direct support for 
women in development is surely a step in the right direction; the 
impact of women on the structure and opportunities for the family 
(the basic unit of any social infrastructure) is fundamental. The 
concern is that WID and other social development policies do not 
offer a quick enough return for politicians and bilateral aid bureau- 
crats, and so they and the institutions that they run may not stay on 
course. 
Global Problems 
The case for global official assistance is the reverse of the 
current practice of bilateral aid. As noted, bilateral aid often seeks 
leverage and political advantage with client countries and, in the 
process, redefines the spirit as well as the definition of overseas 
development assistance. For example, administrative expenses, mili- 
tary and police training as well as private sector market studies are all 
defined as part of a country's ODA budget; very soon the reconstruc- 
tion and reform in Eastern Europe and the ex-Soviet states may be 
added to this small pot. Although the definition of aid urgently 
requires revision, the most disadvantageous aspect of bilateral aid is 
that its national ownership rarely permits it to grapple with global 
problems. Multinational institutions, such as the World Bank Group 
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and the UN system, are being asked - a feature of the New Interna- 
tional Order - to do more with less. 
The preservation and improvement of the world environment 
is one of the most urgent and pressing challenges; we all agree that 
to dent these issues requires not only common goals but collective 
action. The UN Environment and Development Secretariat calcu- 
lates that developing countries will need $125 bn per year into the 
foreseeable future to ensure environmentally sustainable growth. 
This figure does not include the costs of global clean-up in developed 
countries. Global development problems require secure and inde- 
pendent funds, and innovative ways of obtaining them. 
Has the time come for a global tax system, levied on indi- 
viduals and not governments? A world citizenship tax? 
Given our biology and history, should we not accept that there 
are some common basic properties of the world and our heritage 
that we want to preserve, independent of our nationality? Further, 
that the United Nations system, for all its weaknesses, is the only 
current enterprise which has the potential for dealing with global 
issues, even though its current performance can be - and is - 
criticized. For the UN, or any alternative system, to work success- 
fully, it should have its own resources; at present the UN does not 
levy taxes and depends on the largesse - and so agreement - of the 
larger nations.12 The potential for the UN as a global system (which 
represents our common interests) is slowly being formed (with 
amoeba like speed) as a consensus grows that there are common 
properties (the heritage of humankind) which we should preserve for 
our children (whatever nationality, race, colour or creed). In the past, 
"who owned the moon?" was a school child's joke. With the 
commencement of space flight, seabed exploration, the reduction in 
air quality and Chernobyl, compounded with the knowledge that 
world population will grow to 8.5 bn people in 2025, the use of finite 
natural resources - the ownership of the global commons and 
therefore inter-generational rights - becomes even more urgent. The 
arguments for a global taxation system are skilfully examined in 
Ruben Mendez's International Public Finance which will soon 
become, in my view, an indispensable source for the development 
debate.13 Given the urgent problems faced by the United Nations, 
taxpayers should be given the right to designate tax dollars for 
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international agencies of choice - and receive a tax credit - as bilateral 
donor agencies make world environment and other agreed common 
interests priorities of official aid. 
Popular Support? 
The demand for aid grows. Its supply is diminishing as indus- 
trial countries increasingly look for discretionary funds to use in 
other, more pressing, domestic areas. One cannot but suspect a 
secret pleasure in advocating developing country economic reform 
together with the promotion of private flows; it removes responsibil- 
ity from hard-pressed governments (without abandoning the joys of 
the moral high ground). To ordinary citizens, however, aid argu- 
ments must seem arcane because the issues are not simply technical 
- which instruments to use? - but rests on an underlying question - 
what is aid for? 
Many citizens have straightforward answers. The Canadian 
Government, to take one example, undertakes public attitude sur- 
veys which record that Canadians regard food, health and shelter as 
the most important obstacles to be overcome by developing coun- 
tries; that aid should relieve suffering and that churches and charitable 
organizations (followed by the United Nations) are the most effective 
partners; while, on the other hand, there are increasing doubts that 
aid sent to poor countries gets to the people who need it most. A 
growing number of Canadians believe, with well over one half 
strongly agreeing, that "Canada should help the needy in Canada 
first. "14 
The strong message, as it has been since the surveys began, is 
people first; this is because, most Canadian taxpayers - and one 
presumes taxpayers in other countries - like to see direct results. 
Elected governments have to pay some heed to public views if 
development aid is to be maintained as a relatively constant item of 
public expenditure, and so industrial country governments, such as 
Canada, take the people perspective into account. 
Should governments, like that of Canada, follow a more 
popular, people-directed aid program (which would, given con- 
stant or declining aid flows, reduce bilateral leverage between 
industrial donors and developing country recipients)? 
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The arguments for an expansion of people to people pro- 
grams are in the Report and one would have thought that such 
arguments might be favoured by governments interested in reducing 
the costs of the public service. First, non-governmental agencies, in 
general, are less costly and their dollar delivery value more efficient; 
second, their mandates emphasise personal experience and resolv- 
ing human problems on a micro scale - the scale where most 
development takes place; and third, a Canadian discussion point 
perhaps, as our country becomes more multicultural, there is an 
urgent need to understand different cultures in situ. The Peace 
Corps was an important influence in attempting to reverse the 
insularity of a generation in the United States. We, in Canada, are 
beginning to have cultural myopia about how people should behave 
and the rules they should follow; multiculturalism might become a 
new puritanism relying on the idea of different experiences rather 
than the experience of different cultures. Work and education in 
different countries - in this case developing countries and through 
NGOs - will have a salutary impact on Canada's future ability to deal 
with multicultural social problems. If the idea seems familiar, it is - it is 
an endorsement for the old CUSO.15 
There is, also, a need for greater knowledge about the work of 
development agencies and their high probabilities of failure. Politi- 
cians - who increasingly speak for development agencies and see 
them as goody bags to round off bouts of international tourism - 
believe that a realistic discussion would be fatal to development aid. 
Thus, the system works, from NGO to government official (and in 
spite of the evidence) to demonstrate success. After thirty years of 
projects and programs, one would hope for greater realism, open- 
ness and focus; one would hope for the didactic spirit of The 
Challenge of Development. The World Bank, for example, pub- 
lishes its evaluation results where one can read that 70 percent of 
projects are considered satisfactory, but that the percentage of 
satisfactory projects has been falling since operations evaluations 
commenced in 1974.16 There is no such series for the Canadian 
International Development Agency (CIDA) and, one suspects, for 
most bilateral agencies. The unwillingness to discuss aid perform- 
ance (thirty percent is a good record when compared to industrial 
projects and innovation launches here) is a deficiency of bilateral 
agencies to act professionally and to treat citizens and their views 
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seriously. If current aid practice is poor, it should be abandoned, but 
it is no response to aid fatigue to announce yet another policy and 
expect, without evidence, taxpayers to trust government declara- 
tions alone. In future, there should be a much greater emphasis on 
publishing evaluations and discussing their results with citizens and 
stakeholders. It is possible, of course, that the results will turn 
taxpayers away from development aid, but the discussion will allow 
an examination of the how and why of our relations with developing 
countries, and our attitude as an industrial country which seems 
more and more, only to regard them as potential consumer mar- 
kets. But aid and trade are different; the public survey results confirm 
this view. 
Canadian Institutions 
Canadian institutions, such as the Canadian International De- 
velopment Agency and the International Development Research 
Centre, are undergoing change, driven, in part, by the current 
government's wish to reduce and simplify their administrative costs 
and, it seems, to respond more directly to the government's view of 
Canada's national interests. The Canadian aid program disbursed 
about $ 2.5 bn in 1990, approximately .5 percent of GDP and about 
1.7 percent of the federal budget. In total aid disbursements it ranks 
about eighth among DAC members. There are many points which 
can and have been made about these changes, but they are in 
essence questions about Canadian experience and values. 
Should Canada continue to have an aid program, and if so, 
what should be its objectives? 
Canada has a notable development tradition and it should be 
used to answer this pressing issue - not as promoters but as profes- 
sionals. The general disillusion with aid could end, and perhaps 
should, the current role of our development agencies. Is there a 
special place for Canadian expertise and its development tradition or 
should Canada become an exemplary world citizen and subordinate 
its national interests and program into a global or multilateral aid 
force? Can relatively small programs avoid demonstrating their na- 
tional value (to business and other interest groups) and maintain the 
value and integrity of aid? Or should Canada use a combination of 
private companies and non-governmental agencies (trade and hu- 
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manitarian aid) to deliver the aid program? The virtue of the Chal- 
lenge of Development is that it raises these issues which require, if 
there is to be a renewed Canadian development program, answers. 
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NOTES 
'Development Co-operation, 1991, p. 119. 
2 Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Finland, France, Ger- 
many, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, 
Switzerland, United Kingdom, and the United States. 
3 Non DAC Aid is provided by Spain, Portugal, Luxembourg 
and Iceland who are members of the OECD but not the DAC 
Committee, Central Europe and the Soviet Union, Arab countries 
(principally Kuwait and Saudi Arabia), and a number of developing 
country donors including, at different times, China, India, Ven- 
ezuela, Korea and Taiwan. In 1980, their total disbursements 
amounted to $13 bn and in 1990 around $10 bn. principally from 
Arab countries. 
o See T.1.3, p. 24. Although DFI is expected to grow more 
quickly than officials grants and loans, non DFI private flows are 
expected to grow even more rapidly suggesting that bank loans will 
resume to developing countries. DFI constituted 84 percent of pri- 
vate flows in 1989. 
5 The WDR notes that "they will probably remain concen- 
trated in globally integrated, middle income countries with well 
developed infrastructure" (p. 24, emphasis added). 
6 "Between 1966 and 1986, the share of imports affected by 
all non tariff measures increased by more than 20 percent for the 
United States, almost 40 percent for Japan and 160 for the EC" (p. 
104). 
See Fig. 6.5, p. 126. Aggregate net resource flows are net 
flows on the long term debt, plus grants and net foreign direct 
investment. Transfers are aggregate net resources minus interest 
payments on long term loans and repatriation of profits. 
"The Report puts this down to a lack of data (p. 115). 
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11 See World Bank Annual Report, 1989, p. 78-81, for this 
discussion. The future directions also include limiting Bank adjust- 
ment loans in order to protect projects and sectoral support and 10 
See Box 3.6, p. 68, where bilateral and multilateral aid is recorded 
from 1980-88. 
10 See Box 3.6, p. 68, where bilateral and multilateral aid is 
recorded from 1980-88. 
" See p. 147 which continues to advocate attention to social 
adjustment programs. In a previous passage, the Report acknowl- 
edges the difficult choices facing donor agencies under.extreme 
economic conditions. 
12 The United States, for example, deliberately pays its quotas 
three months late in order to emphasise - as if an institution in New 
York needed such a reminder - that it is the greatest financial 
contributor to the system. 
13 Now published by the Oxford University Press, 1992. The 
book reviews most of the arguments found here from the valuable 
perspective of international public finance.. 
14 Published by CIDA, different years since 1986. 
15 See Ian Smillie, The Land of Lost Content. A History of 
CUSO (Toronto, 1985). 
"See Annex 1, Evaluations Results for 1989, p. 93. The 
series discusses why some projects succeed and others fail. 
80 Does Development Assistance Matter? 
Table 5.4 
Aid Dependency: GDP & Social Investment, 1989 
ODA % Social 
Country (mn S) 
%GDP Investment 
Highly Aid Dependent 
Gambia 94 52.2 15.9 
Mozambique 759 49.0 7.8 
Somalia 440 45.4 11.6 
Solomon Is. 48 36.9 - 
Maldives 28 35.0 25.9 
Vanuatu 39 32.5 2.6 
Eq. Guinea 42 30.0 0.0 
Malawi 394 29.8 5.4 
Chad 329 28.1 .10.6 
Samoa 27 27.0 6.5 
Mali 470 26.1 13.8 
Tanzania 918 24.3 8.5 
Mauritania 195 21.4 13.0 
Comoros 43 21.5 2.0 
Subtotal 3,738 
Aid Dependent 
Lao P.D.R. 141 19.9 0.0 
Zambia 388 18.0 7.8 
Ctl. African R. 189 17.5 9.6 
Lesotho 118 17.1 13.0 
Dominica 22 16.9 10.5 
Burundi 198 16.5 34.4 
Benin 247 16.1 20.5 
Nepal - 488 15.5 8.3 
Madagascar 320 15.4 4.3 
Guinea 346 15.0 5.0 
Togo 182 14.7 3.5 
Burkina Faso 284 14.5 3.0 
Senegal 652 14.4 8.5 
Bhutan 40 13.3 29.3 
St. Vincent 17 13.1 0.0 
Ethiopia 702 12.2 18.1 
St. Kitts 14 11.7 64.3 
Kenya 967 11.6 20.7 
Rwanda 238 11.5 5.3 
Papua N.G. 334 11.4 2.7 
Zaire 637 11.1 18.1 
Bolivia 432 11.0 19.9 
Belize 29 11.0 8.7 
Sierra Leone 99 10.6 8.8 
(Grenada 14 10.1 0.4 
Subtotal 7,099 
ODA % Social 
Country (mn $) 
%GDP Investment 
Aid Influenced 
Jamaica 258 9.9 34.7 
Bangladesh 1,791 9.8 5.6 
Ghana 543 9.7 6.3 
St. Lucia 21 9.5 - 
Sudan 760 9.4 2.6 
El Salvador 446 9.3 48.9 
Uganda 397 8.9 20.7 
Haiti 198 8.8 13.6 
Botswana 162 8.4 68.7 
Nicaragua 227 8.1 6.2 
Sri Lanka 558 7.9 38.3 
Lebanon 132 7.8 11.3 
Jordan 280 6.3 10.4 
Honduras 256 6.2 28.5 
Liberia 58 5.9 7.8 
Swaziland 29 5.0 - 
Subtotal 6,116 
Total 15,950 
ODA Total 34,120 1.3 15.2 
Source: Human Development Report (1991), T. 18. 
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Table 5.5 
World Bank Countries: ODA & DFI, 1989 (US $mn) 
Wf3 Country ODA Percent Remittances Percent Net Percent No. GNP ODA DFI ODA 
Highly Aid Dependent 
I Mozambique 759 59.2 - - 0 0.0 
4 Somalia 440 38.9 - - - - 
3 Tanzania 918 32.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 
32 Lesotho 118 26.0 - - 13 11.0 
7 Malawi 394 24.9 - - 
9 Chad 239 23.5 (21) -8.8 (12) -5.0 
16 Mali 470 22.6 39 8.3 (3) -0.6 
6 Lao P.D.R. 141 22.5 0 0.0 
Subtotal 3,479 18 (2) 
Aid Dependent 
34 Mauritania 195 19.4 4 2.1 3 1.5 
10 Burundi 198 18.6 - 1 0.5 
26 Ctl. African R. 189 17.1 (29) -15.3 - - 
8 Nepal 488 16.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 
25 Benin 247 14.7 57 23.1 1 0.4 
17 Niger 296 14.5 (40) 13.5 18 6.1 
42 Angola 140 14.4 - - 200 142.9 
45 Senegal 652 14.0 30 4.6 (20) -3.1 
28 Togo 182 13.6 4 2.2 - 
12 Madagascar 320 12.6 (11) -3.4 6 1.9 
30 Guinea 346 12.6 0 0.0 10 - 
23 Kenya 967 11.7 (3) -0.3 69 7.1 
2 Ethiopia 702 11.6 - - - - 
18 Burkina Faso 284 11.1 147 51.8 2 0.7 
19 Rwanda 238 11.0 (17) -7.1 16 6.7 
11 Sierra Leone 99 10.5 0 . 0.0 - - 
27 Ghana 543 10.3 3 0.6 15 2.8 
Subtotal 6,086 145 321 
Aid Influenced 
43 Bolivia 432 9.6 (1) -0.2 (25) -5.8 
52 Papua N.G. 334 9.5 46 13.8 186 55.7 
4 Bangladesh 1,791 8.9 771 43.0 0 0.0 
14 Uganda 397 8.4 - - 0 0.0 
29 Zambia 388 8.3 (21) -5.4 - - 
31 Sri Lanka 558 7.9 338 60.6 27 4.8 
62 El Salvador 446 7.6 242 54.3 0 0.0 
15 Zaire 637 6.6 - - 12 1.9 
65 Jamaica 258 6.6 71 27.5 28 10.9 
68 Botswana 162 6.5 - - 129 79.6 
69 Jordan 280 6.3 561 200.4 0 0.0 
53 Honduras 256 5.2 - - 37 14.5 
Subtotal 5,939 2,007 394 
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Table 5.5 continued 
World Bank Countries: ODA & DFI, 1989 (US $mn) 
W B Percent Percent Net Percent 
No. Country ODA GNP Remittances ODA DFI ODA 
Aid Recipient 
44 Egypt 1,578 4.7 4,254 269.6 I,S86 1003 
47 Zimbabwe 266 4.5 - - (9) -3.4 
49 Cote d'lvoire 409 4.4 0 0.0 n. a. - 
72 Costa Rica 224 4.3 - - 115 51.3 
57 Cameroon 470 4.2 3 0.6 31 6.6 
55 Congo P.R. 91 4.0 (5S) -60.4 0 0.0 
89 Gabon 134 3.9 (151) -112.7 80 59.7 
S4 Guatemala 256 3.1 40 15.6 80 31.3 
24 Pakistan 1,119 2.8 1,902 170.0 170 15.2 
74 Mauritius S7 2.7 - - 26 45.6 
103 Israel 1,192 2.6 - - 
66 Tunisia 247 2.5 482 195.1 24 9.7 
60 Namibia 44 2.3 - - - - 
61 Paraguay 91 2.2 - 21 23.1 
50 Dominican R. 141 2.1 306 110 78.0 
51 Morocco 443 2.0 1,325 299.1 167 37.7 
33 Indonesia 1,830 1.9 125 6.8 735 40.2 
48 Philippines 831 1.9 360 43.3 482 S8.0 
59 Ecuador 162 1.6 - - 80 49.4 
56 Syria 139 1.2 225 161.9 
13 Nigeria 339 1.1 (19) -5.6 2,082 614.2 
64 Thailand 697 1.0 - 1,650 236.7 
58 Peru 300 1.0 - 59 19.7 
20 India 1,874 0.7 2,650 141.4 42S 22.7 
21 China 2,227 0.5 138 6.2 1,400 2.6 
87 Uruguay 38 O.S - - 1 2.6 
76 Argentina 215 0.4 0 0.0 1,028 478.1 
77 Malaysia 139 0.4 - - 1,846 1328.1 
70 Panama 17 0.4 - - 12 70.6 
78 Algeria 153 0.3 355 232.0 (S9) -38.6 
67 Turkey 122 0.2 3,040 2491.8 663 543.4 
63 Colombia 62 0.2 459 740.3 546 880.6 
71 Chile 62 0.2 - - 259 417.7 
90 Iran 89 0.1 - - - 
88 Yugoslavia 43 0.1 (151) -351.2 - - 
91 Trinidad 6 0.1 0 0.0 36 600.0 
85 Brazil 189 0.0 - - 782 413.8 
75 Mexico 97 0.0 321 330.9 2,241 2310.3 
83 Venezuela 21 0.0 (368) -1752.4 77 366.7 
Subtotal 15,161 11,585 9,314 
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Table 5.5 continued 
World Bank Countries: ODA & DFI, 1989 (US $mn) 
WB Country ODA Percent Remittances Percent Net Percent No. GNP ODA DFI ODA 
Other 
40 Sudan 760 297 39.1 0 0.0 
82 Nicaragua 227 - - - - 
39 Myanmar 220 0 0.0 154 70.0 
41 wet Nam 138 - - - - 
80 Lebanon 132 
35 Afghanistan 95 - 
38 Liberia 58 51 87.9 
36 Bhutan 40 - 
37 Kampuchea 25 - 
Subtotal 1,695 348 154 
TOTAL 32,360 14,103 10,181 





THE WORLD BANK: 
MARKET OR PEOPLE-FRIENDLY? 
Ruben R Mendez 
Of the many reports issued by public international organiza- 
tions, the World Bank's World Development Report is probably 
the most widely read. Its data are broad-ranging, timely and exten- 
sively used. There are, of course, other more detailed reports, such 
as the World Debt Tables, OECD's Development Co-operation 
Report and the IMF's International Financial Statistics. But these 
are for specialized audiences and purposes, and the WDR is prob- 
ably the best single report for a general compilation of data on 
development. Its publication each May is therefore a special occa- 
sion, to which both development practitioners and academicians 
look forward. It is a time when they can review the latest data and 
update themselves. 
The views expressed in this paper are those of the author and do not 
necessarily reflect those of UNDP. Part of the paper is based on a book by 
the author, International Public Finance: A New Perspective on Global 
Relations (NewYork: Oxford University Press, 1992). 
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The World Bank also uses the occasion of the publication of 
the WDR to expound a special theme. In 1988 the Report focused 
on public finance, in 1989 on financial systems, in 1990 on poverty, 
and in 1992 on the timely subject of the environment. The categori- 
cal free-market views of the World Bank permeate all of these 
expositions. In the case of the 1991 Report, the subject of the 
colloquium convened by the Lester Pearson Institute for Interna- 
tional Development, the virtues of the marketplace constitute the 
special theme of the Report. 
The objectivity of the World Bank's statistics does not charac- 
terize its thematic expositions, which are ideologically based. These 
expositions, however, are presented tendentiously and with the 
same magisterial stance as the statistical section. In view of the large 
readership of the WDR, the convening of this colloquium to discuss 
the 1991 issue in depth is a salutary undertaking. There is a need to 
reassure the world that economic theories - whether Communist or 
capitalist - cannot be ideologically decreed nor presented as dogma. 
In his opening presentation, the 1991 WDR's principal au- 
thor, Vinod Thomas, gave an inspired overview of the report, i.e. of 
its expository part, and of its main concerns. There were four 
important points I particularly noted: 
a) that development assistance has worked, as demonstrated, 
among other things, by a doubling of living standards and a 
halving of infant mortality rates in recent years; 
b) that there is a need for a reduction of trade barriers by the 
industrialized countries, and for increased support to develop- 
ing countries in the form of financing and assistance in policy 
reform; 
c) that growth is a prerequisite for development: we should aim at 
"unbridled" growth, while targeting the problems of poverty 
and the environment; 
cp that developing countries, for their part, should be more 
"market friendly," get prices and macroeconomic policy "right" 
promote competition, improve the climate for private 
enterprises, and deregulate. 
Ruben P. Mendez 87 
With points a) to c) I am in general agreement, although what 
constitutes policy "reform" is arguable. I was favourably impressed 
by Mr. Thomas's defence of the impact of development and his 
emphasis on "unbridled growth", combined with a pro-active target- 
ing of the problems of poverty and the environment. While he did 
not go into the specifics of how this can be done, it does point to an 
important fact: there can be no development or poverty alleviation in 
the poor countries of the world without economic growth; complete 
redistribution and perfect distribution in a country where per capita 
income is only $200 annually will not go into the root of its 
problems. The problems are not simply how the pie is divided but 
how to have a larger and complete welfare pie. For all of these, 
development assistance is needed, as is a recognition by the industri- 
alized world that its trade restrictions are a serious constraint to the 
growth of the developing countries. 
I am not so sanguine, on the other hand, about the WDR's 
diagnoses and all-encompassing prescriptions concerning develop- 
ment policies and activities, which are encapsulated in the term 
"market friendly". Nor do I agree with the WDR's statements that 
there is a consensus on this view, and that it has been born out by 
experience. This is a view from the North, or at least from Bretton 
Woods, rather than a universal view. 
I was recently discussing the concept of "market friendliness" 
with Paul Streeten, who remarked that the market is a mechanism, 
and what development policy should seek to be is "people friendly". 
The description of the Macintosh as "user friendly", it will be 
recalled, refers to persons and not to mechanisms. While develop- 
ment has many facets, this indeed should be the guiding philosophy 
of development. Being "people friendly" is, in the final analysis, the 
true meaning of "human development". 
There have already been excellent critiques of the WDR by 
Paul Bowles, Barry Lesser and Tony Tillett (not to mention the 
detailed technical analysis by Lance Taylor with his colleagues at 
MIT, Jose Maria Fanelli and Roberto Frenkel). The panellists and 
other participants have also raised important questions in the course 
of the discussions. They have questioned, for instance, whether 
competition per se is always desirable since it does not deal with the 
environment. The United States may wish to ensure that tuna 
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fishing companies do not deplete marine resources or trap dolphins 
with the fish, and this may lessen their competitiveness vis-a-vis 
others not as environmentally concerned. They have also noted that 
markets do not address the problem of poverty. The observation 
about Julius Nyrere's role in Tanzania as being nation-building and 
not only socialism was also discerning. In these days of ethnic strife 
in Africa, Asia and Europe, one can appreciate the value of long- 
term effectiveness as well of efficiency. 
Among the 1991 WDR's principal shortcomings is its cavalier 
dismissal of the problem of market failures. Its discussion of market 
failure is rather brief: 
It was assumed that in the early stages of development markets 
could not be relied upon, and that the state would be able to 
direct the development process. The major development insti- 
tutions supported these views with varying degrees of 
enthusiasm. By the early 1980s the dominant paradigm had 
shifted (p. 33). 
While private enterprise competition is in many respects an efficient 
mechanism for allocating resources, it continues to be subject to 
market failures, both nationally and internationally. These include an 
inability to produce public goods, to deal with externalities (both 
positive and negative, the latter of which are at the root of problems 
of the environment) and to prevent competitive breakdowns. Al- 
though the subject of such failures is not as widely or as intensely 
articulated as the virtues of the marketplace, the fact is that it cannot 
be ignored by policy makers and scholars, and is an area in which 
the public sector has to give a helping hand. A judicious mix of free 
markets and public sector intervention is necessary. With the almost 
total demise of communism, it is the mixed economy that is now 
more than ever the dominant system as well as the dominant 
paradigm. 
The following are some of the market's main shortcomings: 
a) It is unable to ensure the production of public goods or their 
production at adequate levels. The reason for this is that for 
most public goods, people cannot be excluded from consuming 
them, and there is no additional cost in the consumption of the 
goods by an additional person. Private enterprise, therefore, 
Ruben P. Mendez 89 
will find no motive for producing them since it cannot earn a 
profit from doing so. Thus, clean air, highways, police protection 
- and at the international level the maintenance of the ozone 
layer, peacekeeping and the prevention of marine pollution - 
all need intervention by the public sector. 
b) It is incapable of dealing with negative externalities. Private 
firms by themselves will not take into account the costs of 
environmental pollution, nor the tensions caused by the arms 
race, since these costs are not reflected in their income-and- 
expenditure statements or balance sheets. These costs, while 
"external" to the firms, are very real, and the intervention of 
the public sector, say through taxes, regulation and fines, is 
necessary to internalize them so that they are reflected in the 
cost accounts of their producers. 
c) It is unable to capture as financial returns for the producers the 
external benefits of certain goods, which will therefore be 
underproduced by private firms in a completely free economy. 
One example is education, which benefits not only the person 
receiving the training but also society at large. Another example 
is the prevention and control of communicable diseases. 
Benefits are not only to the recipients of vaccinations but also 
to others, because there are fewer carriers and transmitters of 
disease. If left to the market mechanism, such external benefits 
will be underproduced because private producers do not capture 
the full returns. This is why. various education and health 
programmes are publicly subsidized. 
d) It cannot cope with competitive breakdowns, such as monopolies 
and, monopsonies, incomplete markets and information. 
Incomplete markets include the lack of markets for capital and 
credit. The underprovision by the private sector of capital to 
the less developed countries is a raison d'etre of public institutions 
such as the World Bank. Even the IMF may be considered as 
filling in for another market failure - the lack of insurance for 
countries experiencing severe balance of payments difficulties 
as a result of exogenous events (even though the IMF acts as 
though the difficulties were due to mismanagement and not 
outside factors). 
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Although strictly speaking not a "market failure", the market 
also does not address the question of poverty alleviation and distribu- 
tional equity. Economic efficiency is not concerned with the problems 
of poverty and the extremes of income and wealth. A "people 
friendly" economy thus calls for public sector intervention. 
Another shortcoming of the WDR's approach, which is incor- 
porated in the World Bank's structural adjustment programmes, is 
the fallacy of composition: that what is good for one is good for all. 
This applies, among other things, to devaluations, which the World 
Bank insists upon to make countries more competitive in the world 
market. For instance, Kenya may be forced to devalue its currency to 
make its tea exports less expensive overseas, which could have an 
adverse impact on another tea exporter, Sri Lanka. If Sri Lanka were 
forced to do the same the effects of these actions would cancel each 
other out, with the tea-importing countries (not the least the United 
Kingdom and the United States!) benefiting. 
Despite protestations to the contrary, the IMF and the World 
Bank seem to have a standard recipe, based on assumptions that 
market failures are less important than government failures, that the 
rational allocation of existing resources is more important for growth 
than increasing resources or at least a pre-condition for it, that 
"getting prices right" is the highest priority, and the like. Critics ask 
for greater or more balanced emphasis on market failures compared 
to government failures, for supportive infrastructure as well as price 
incentives, for symmetrical adjustments by creditor countries, and 
for more sensitivity to the dangers of competitive devaluation by 
debtor countries. 
It would have been useful for the WDR to have empirical 
studies to illustrate its thesis on the effectiveness of its SAL and other 
development policies. Existing studies on SALs are highly critical. A 
detailed analysis by Mosley, Harrigan, and Toye,' including nine case 
studies, states that in very poor countries, the Bank's policies have 
been a "gratuitous obstruction", where privatization and the re- 
moval of infant-industry protective structures are "at best an 
irrelevance". The analysis concludes that while SALs have generally 
been favourable to export growth and the external account, they 
have almost everywhere also depressed aggregate investment and 
had a neutral effect on national income, financial flows from over- 
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seas and distribution. They have "consisted of a mixture of protec- 
tion for the inefficient, intervention with a social rationale (e.g., food 
subsidies)", indicating that "there are more justifications for govern- 
ment intervention than the Bank has generally been prepared to 
accept and ... further work to determine the appropriate form and 
levels of such intervention is now urgent". 
A study by UNCTAD2 covering twelve least developed coun- 
tries that carried out IMF-negotiated structural adjustment programmes 
indicates that their performance did not differ significantly from that 
of least developed countries as a whole. The lack of any consistent 
relationship between the adoption of structural adjustment pro- 
grammes and economic performance, as reflected in growth, the 
current account balance, and inflation brings these programmes into 
question. The foregoing, plus the high social costs of these pro- 
grammes and the political instability they produce, make one wonder 
whether the World Bank and the IMF fully understand the conse- 
quences and implications of their policies. 
There are alternatives to the present laissez-faire pattern of 
North-South resource flows. This pattern consists almost entirely of 
official development assistance (ODA), which is almost completely 
voluntary, non-concessional public sector loans and private invest- 
ment - all of which, everyone in the colloquium agreed, have been 
inadequate and do not have bright prospects for substantial improve- 
ment. Among the alternatives, which are discussed in detail in a 
recent book I have written,3 are the following: 
a) The global commons can be the subject both of u-ser charges 
and regulation for environmental purposes. A precedent may 
be found in charges for the exploitation of the deep ocean bed, 
which has been designated part of the common heritage of 
mankind by the United Nations Convention on the Law of the 
Sea. Similar policies can be applied to navigation and overflight, 
Antarctica (a disputed common) and the Southern Ocean, the 
geostationary orbit and the electromagnetic spectrum. 
There are possibilities for true international taxation, both for 
revenue-generating and corrective, or "Pigovian", purposes to 
internalize negative externalities. Such taxes are ubiquitous in 
national systems of public finance. Internationally - aside from 
the assessed financial obligations of member states to the 
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regular budgets of the United Nations and its traditional 
specialized agencies and quota subscriptions to the IMF and the 
World Bank - precedents may be found in the Montreal Protocol 
on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, and in the 
European Community. In the latter, members of the Community 
pay 1 percent of their value-added-tax (VAT) income to the 
European Commission - a form of an international revenue tax 
- with the percentage increasing gradually over the years as 
Europe-wide legislation supersedes national legislation. The 
potentials deserve serious consideration. The volume of 
international trade in 1989 amounted to $3,140 billion in 
1989, as measured by the volume of imports, so that a tax of 
only 0.1 percent could have yielded over $3 billion. 
c) Other possibilities that could be revisited are the proposed 
Special Drawing Right (SDR) - and gold-development links. 
i) Although the IMF's Articles of Agreement state that SDRs, 
sometimes called "paper gold," shall become the princi- 
pal reserve asset, the IMF has not issued any since the last 
allocation of 1979-81, on the grounds that there does not 
appear to be a shortage of world liquidity. While this may 
be true of the industrialized countries, it is not the case 
with the developing countries, which are very much in 
need of foreign reserves to pay for their imports and their 
debt burden. A new issuance of SDRs plus their distribu- 
tion, at least in part, on the basis of need, could go a long 
way in resolving the world's debt crisis and the need for 
capital for development. 
ii) The IMF still has 103 million ounces of gold in its coffers. 
If these were sold - again, in line with a standing agree- 
ment, that gold should be phased out in the international 
monetary system - the proceeds could be used for devel- 
opment purposes. If the IMF sold less than half of its gold 
stock, say 50 million ounces, over a period of time at an 
average price of $350 per ounce, the proceeds would 
amount to $17.5 billion. A precedent exists in the IMF's 
sale of part of its gold holdings in the late 1970s, allocat- 
ing part of the proceeds to a trust fund for concessional 
loans to developing countries. 
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Despite warnings by the delegates to the IMF of the United 
States, Germany and other rich countries, scientific models 
and other computations by respected economists show that 
SDR - and gold-development links would not be inflationary. 
There is much that remains to be done and can be done to 
promote development in the poor countries and the world at large. 
While the market can be harnessed to help in this process, we 
cannot afford to be blind to its limits. The end of the cold war should 
not be seen as the triumph of the market over the state. It should be 
seen, rather, as an end to extremism and a time to develop new 
means of financing, focusing on the well-being of the people. 
[1 found the meeting highly useful. As I have drawn to the 
attention of my senior colleagues at UNDP, I believe it would be 
beneficial for UNDP staff to participate more frequently in 
discussions with economists and other development specialists 
from universities and other organizations in colloquia such as the 
one organized by Tony Tillett. The process of cross-fertilization 
would be valuable both in increasing the awareness by UNDP 
staff of current economic thinking and by other organizations of 
the work that UNDP is doing in the development field, botl- 
operationally and intellectually.] 
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As the seminar demonstrated, there are two quite different 
reactions to the 1991 World Development Report. Some see it as a 
profoundly conservative document because it makes a strong case 
for the role of the market in economic development. Others, myself 
included, think it comparatively progressive because it points out that 
the market cannot do everything. It finds that some challenges of 
development, like helping the poorest people, must be met by 
strong effective, government. 
In the present ideological climate, that amounts to boldness. 
The defeat of communism has been seized upon by the libertarian 
right to show that government does not and cannot work, from 
which it follows that the less of it the better. Skilful propaganda 
mixed with the deeply cynical mood of many people in the industri- 
alized democracies converted this bit of ideology into folk wisdom. 
Today, those who have a good word to say for government have 
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become a timid minority, afraid to appear in public during daylight 
hours. 
In these circumstances, it is all the more surprising that the 
1991 World Development Report (the broadsheet of international 
capitalism, as some see it) has a good word to say for government. 
Generally speaking, what it says is that governments should leave 
the production and distribution of goods and services to the market 
while recognizing that there are many other tasks at which markets 
prove inadequate or fail altogether. 
That is why governments must, for example, invest in infra- 
structure and provide essential services to the poor. It is not a 
question of the state or market: each has a large and irreplace- 
able role. 
There you have it: the World Bank has said that there is a large 
and irreplaceable role for government. The Report labels its overall 
approach to development as "market friendly" although, given the 
political winds blowing these days, it might have been more helpful 
to call it government friendly or, better still, people friendly. In most 
parts of the world, it is not markets which are under assault but 
governments, or rather the notion that governments have some- 
thing useful to contribute to human welfare. 
There is another very sensible and important thing the 1991 
Report has to say, namely that the first element of a market friendly 
approach is investing in people. The Report points out that the 
economic returns - the economic returns - from public and private 
investments in people are often extremely high and that these 
particular investments are the special responsibility of government: 
Markets in developing countries cannot generally be relied 
upon to provide people - especially the poorest - with adequate 
education (especially primary education) health care, nutrition 
and family planning services. 
This amounts to a revolution in the vocabulary of political 
discourse. Investment in people? We have been trained in the belief 
that education and health care and the rest are social or welfare 
programs, good or bad for the soul depending on your point of view, 
but certainly not a hard-headed investment. But here comes the 
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World Bank saying that investment in people is an important ele- 
ment. 
All of this strikes me as quite progressive capitalism. It is a 
much needed corrective to the right wing bunk that has been parad- 
ing as political wisdom for most of the past decade. It is a reminder 
that the late nineteenth and the earlier twentieth centuries applied a 
corrective to capitalism - the corrective of countervailing government 
power - without which it might well have suffered the same fate as 
communism. (Not that the corrective was much appreciated by 
capitalists at the time, or since. Franklin Roosevelt was fond of 
saying that it was his job to "save the bastards from themselves.") 
The World Bank Report has a good word to say for govern- 
ment but it is less charitable about particular governments. The 1991 
Report finds that third world governments spend too much (time and 
money) doing what they should not do (playing around with their 
economies) and not nearly enough investing in people. It calls for 
increases in both the quantity and quality of these investments 
noting, for example, the advantages of primary health care systems 
over expensive curative systems. What is particularly appealing about 
that bit of advice, and much of the rest, is that it applies as well to 
developed as to developing countries. Just to catch the attention of 
the Bank's largest shareholder, the Report mentions that "by some 
estimates Shanghai has a lower infant mortality rate and longer life 
expectancy than New York City." 
The only problem with this advice - a problem associated with 
the entire thrust of the 1991 Report - is that it has been around for a 
long time and generally ignored. The World Bank is too sanguine 
about the happy complementarity of the market and government. 
The notion that capitalists will maximize their profits while govern- 
ments satisfy basic human needs amount to the last gasp of yuppie 
economics: yes indeed, the Bank seems to be saying, you can have 
it all! Unfortunately the historical record cited by the Bank suggests 
otherwise. 
If investment in people, particularly the poorest, is the best 
investment, why do so many countries under-invest in people, 
especially the poorest? The answer is as plain as the nose on your 
face - power. What is missing from this Report, and from every 
World Bank Report, is the element of political power. Although it 
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may be economically and morally compelling to invest in people, the 
decision to do so depends on influence over government. And while 
there may be societies in which the poor are powerful, they are few 
and far between. This problem explains why the progressivism of 
the 1991 World Bank Report is so unconvincing in the end. In the 
wake of the Los Angeles riots, it reads too much like the good 
intentions that pave the road to hell. 
The story of Los Angeles offers a less hopeful picture of the 
future than does the World Bank, although it may be more consist- 
ent with the political facts of life. The picture is of an increasingly 
polarized and ghetto-ized world in which the upper and middle 
classes insulate themselves to the extent they can against the intru- 
sions of mass poverty. An observer of the riots explained the logic 
behind this future: "It is cheaper to clean up one of these messes 
every twenty years than it is to correct the problems." If that is the 
logic of the north, who believes that the much poorer south will 
accept the advice of the World Bank? 
MARKETS, STATE AND 
TECHNOLOGY 
Amitav Rath 
The seminar organized by the Lester Pearson Institute for 
International Development to critically review the World Develop- 
ment Report (1991) (WDR) is a valuable initiative. WDR (1991) is a 
specially pertinent document as it is an ambitious attempt to review 
the development experiences of the past decades, often going back 
three to four decades, and at times much further, to examine the 
economic growth experiences of the early industrializers. The ability 
of The World Bank to marshall financial resources and experts, the 
skills and knowledge of its large staff, and, its own experience of 
financing economic development for over forty years, all combine to 
provide the report an intellectual weight which cannot be easily 
duplicated by any other institution. When this is combined with the 
facts that the views of the Bank are expected to be reflected in its 
own lending policies, the largest single source of financial flows for 
most poor countries, that these views also influence the policies and 
frameworks of other bilateral, multilateral and private financial insti- 
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tutions, and thereby, necessarily set the policy framework available 
to the borrowing states, they add substantial practical weight to the 
intellectual. So the value of this seminar, to critically review the 
"Challenges of Development" which have been identified by the 
Bank, are obvious. In fact, the importance of this report suggests it 
deserves greater sustained and careful response than what I can 
provide at this brief workshop. 
Given the limitations of time and space I can only address a few 
selected issues. This requires choices to be made on the issues to 
focus on. The difficulties in making the choices are obvious when 
one notes that the report was generated by a team of over twenty 
World Bank experts, assisted by consultants, and, is laid out in 180 
pages of carefully written text, 41 boxes which highlight specific 
questions and experiences, 30 tables and 35 figures which support 
the text, and an additional 33 tables covering important develop- 
ment data on over 100 countries. It is precisely because of the 
amount of information and the quality of analysis that the WDR is 
always eagerly awaited by students and practitioners of develop- 
ment. 
My task is made somewhat easier by the excellent reviews 
already carried out by Barry Lesser and Tony Tillett of Dalhousie 
University, and Paul Bowles of Saint Mary's University, and the fact 
that a number of commentators such as Ruben Mendez are touching 
on some aspects of the report. These circumstances, I believe, allow 
me to be somewhat idiosyncratic and organize my comments in 
three parts, grouped around things I liked, things I did not like, and 
some suggestions for the future. I take a look at the report from the 
perspective of the literature on technical change. 
First, I wish to congratulate Mr. Vinod Thomas and his team 
for their selection of the themes which are taken up in the WDR as 
they are of fundamental importance. I believe the team has to be 
congratulated for its attempt to take a look at all the important 
factors which contribute to development and the fact that develop- 
ment is not collapsed into the single dimension of GNP or even 
economic growth, though the primary focus is on economic issues. I 
believe the team also must be congratulated for being able to adopt a 
relatively pragmatic and empirical approach to the issues (though I 
am less convinced on how successfully they have managed to stay 
AmitauRath 101 
consistently with the approach when drawing certain policy conclu- 
sions and recommendations and will discuss these later). Finally, I 
must say that I was positively impressed by the inclusion by the team 
of a number of insights from studies of technological change, their 
impact on economic growth and development, the factors which 
seem to affect technological change positively and negatively, and, 
how policies can help improve the contribution of technology to the 
removal of poverty. 
I am in almost complete agreement with the broad conclusion 
reached in the overview: 
(Development) is not a question of intervention versus 
laissez-faire - a popular dichotomy, but a false one. Competi- 
tive markets are the best way yet for efficiently organizing the 
production and distribution of goods and services. Domestic 
and external competition provide the incentive that unleash 
entrepreneurship and technological progress. But markets can- 
not operate in a vacuum - they require a legal and regulatory 
framework that only governments can provide. And, at many 
other tasks, markets prove inadequate or fail altogether... It is 
not a question of state or market: each has a large and 
irreplaceable role (p. 1). 
This is a statement that appears almost "revolutionary" in a 
decade dominated by the nostrums of Reagan, Bush and Thatcher 
who argued that the State is always a hinderance and a withering 
away of the State was a necessary condition for economic growth. It 
is almost a revolutionary statement for finance ministers in many 
poor countries who have had to dismantle the state under the 
pressures of external and domestic deficits and the resultant Struc- 
tural Adjustment Programmes designed and supported by the Bank 
and external donors. 
There are many other useful statements and conclusions in the 
report. The historical review of thinking on development, pointing 
out that it "has repeatedly shifted over the past forty years," "progress 
has not been along a straight line," and the attempt" to gleam from 
the evidence, the accumulated knowledge and insight" are all very 
salutary and should (p. 4) encourage humility and receptivity to new 
ideas. Such a framework supports approaches which are more 
open, and, less ideological and dogmatic. 
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The report does not ignore issues which are not strictly eco- 
nomic such as military spending, wars and political instability on 
development (p. 2). Nor does it ignore issues which are external to 
individual developing countries and therefore beyond their influence, 
but nevertheless have a major, if not dominant, impact on the 
success or failure of national policy. The Bank highlights the non- 
tariff trade barriers imposed by Industrial Countries which range 
from 42% of total trade for Japan to a high of 55% for the EC (p. 
104). It estimates the annual loss of DCs from these export barriers 
to be over 50 billion dollars and points out that this is larger than the 
concessional financial flows to the DCs. It also points out that large 
deficits in the Industrialized Countries (ICs) raise interest rates, re- 
duce resources available to the developing countries and to the 
extent IC policies lead to recessions and economic instability, they 
negatively affect the opportunities for growth in the DCs. 
Finally, the report does a commendable job of reviewing a 
number of key issues in technology and economic developments. 
Some of the points are integrated through the text and a amber 
receive special attention in Chapter 5. Here the discussions cover 
the different channels of technology transfer, point out the needs for 
domestic technological capacity and the need to support innovation. 
It argues that DC governments need to pay greater attention to 
building technological capacity through more and better education, 
fostering competition, and developing a range of technology sup- 
port institutions for information, quality, standards and so on. 
Yet, while the report is in many ways an important contribu- 
tion to the consideration and articulation of the knowledge acquired 
from past experiences spanning several decades, it also falls short of 
its own goals in several ways. My main criticisms are that in several 
places attempts are made to marshall empirical evidence in a "scien- 
tifically" rigorous fashion in support of the views advocated by the 
Bank but which remain quite unsatisfactory. 
Second, within the report evidence contradictory to the posi- 
tion adopted by the Bank are presented but then dismissed as not 
being relevant. 
Third, many times the conclusion states that there is a need 
for a joint role between the state and the market, but with little 
elaboration of how the state can in practice play those roles, given 
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other recommendations which reduce its resources, policy options 
and capacity for implementation. 
Finally, the report can be criticised for the framework within 
which it is articulated, and for what is not discussed, the evidence not 
cited, the issues which are not raised as in the case of the famous 
dog which sometimes did not bark. I will provide a few examples of 
the above. 
In marshalling its statistical evidence, the Bank finds (on pp. 5, 
47) that over 22 years, between 1965-1987, countries with high 
education grew at the highest rates, those at the other extreme grew 
more slowly, and those which had one and not the other were in 
between. In an ecumenical spirit, the report raises questions on 
measurement (p. 44), "there are serious gaps in data on literacy, 
school enrolment," "GDP measures pose important problems in 
comparability across countries and over time," " PPPs generally 
yield a more accurate measure of output," "Policy conclusions 
based on analysis of meagre data sets can be seriously biased." I 
would also add a final question, that even when strong association is 
found between two variables, we have to decide which is the cause 
and which the effect or whether they both may be the effects of a 
separate causal variable. In the above example, we have no idea of 
how many and which countries fell into the three categories; was 
education and distribution measured at the beginning of the period, 
the end of the period or was an average taken over the 22 years; 
was GDP used for the analysis or PPP; how robust was the country 
classification to the chosen and to alternate measures, as many 
other different statistical measures suggest themselves; and why is 
"distortion" measured as the foreign exchange premium grouped 
differently in Figure 5; Table 2.4; and Figures 4.1 and 4.2. Finally, in 
all these analyses of "distortion" and its effects on economic growth, 
the question is not raised as to whether a possible explanation is that 
other factors promoted economic growth, which in turn allowed or 
enabled policies of low distortion and high education. Which is the 
cause and which the effect? 
Having "established" that the "few economies which had 
relatively undistorted prices did well"(p. 4), it goes on to ask the 
important question "why did the interventions in East Asia lead to 
success and not failure?" It answers that it was because they (the 
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East Asian States) were "disciplined," "competent," "pragmatic" 
and "flexible." This conclusion does not sit well with its earlier 
conclusion on the role of the State. The Bank may well counter that 
"appropriate" interventions by a "competent" government together 
with a careful use of the market could be optimal, but in the absence 
of such a "competent" state, markets are better than incompetent 
dirigisme. But it never actually comes out and states it in so many 
words. 
There are many examples of incompetent governments and of 
inappropriate interventions documented in the report which have 
been counter productive. But all examples of misapplied and ineffec- 
tive interventions do not prove that interventions per se are bad or 
not required. The case for non-intervention rests ultimately not on 
empirical evidence but on the premises of neoclassical economics, 
on the efficiency of markets and the efficiency and completeness of 
the set of market prices in their information content, for the rational 
actions of economic agents. In spite of the attention paid to technol- 
ogy in the report, the entire paradigm of the report remains 
uninfluenced by arguments and constructs raised by economists who 
have focused on issues of technical change and innovation. Newer 
concepts of economic theory, such as those emphasizing learning 
and evolutionary processes in economics, the fundamental uncer- 
tainty of the future, the role of expectations and the existence of 
nonlinearities and a number of inherent instabilities of the system, 
have no room in the framework. In these new formulations, markets 
are given a critical role as in the neoclassical, but a different one. In 
such a revised framework, an increasing role of markets, in fact, also 
includes and requires an increased role for an activist, interventionist 
state, not a state which retreats from the economy and only re- 
dresses market failures. 
It is the lack of such a revised framework which makes the 
Bank report unable to deal with contradictions between certain 
evidence, some of it cited in the report and its recommendations. 
Two good examples of such contradictions are the discussion of the 
issues regarding state intervention in trade (p. 102) and on commod- 
ity price movements (p. 106). My own conclusions from the Bank's 
own statements in the report of the case for or against state 
intervention lead toward state intervention and that the Bank's own 
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data on commodity price movements supports The Prebish-Singer 
hypothesis. But, it is impossible for the report to acknowledge this 
without undermining its overall thesis. So the same data suggests the 
opposite conclusion for the Bank. 
In marshalling its case for freer trade, the Bank presents data 
on tariff rates by the early industrialisers. First, the data presented 
supports a view that tariffs were lowered by countries after they 
achieved a certain industrial level. Second, its does not even discuss 
the non-tariff barriers which were also used in the.past. Finally, in 
concluding that presently industrialized countries did not take re- 
course to very high tariffs, it ignores the much higher transaction 
costs to international trade in the past leading to effectively higher 
barriers to international trade. 
One final example of the problems resulting from inappropri- 
ate frameworks is found in the conclusions from Table 2.3, that, 
during 1960 to 1973 and to 1987, TFP for East Asia grew most 
rapidly and so supports market oriented policies. South Asia had 
lower TFP growth rates in the same period due to protectionist 
policies. Another conclusion possible is that the data, in fact, sup- 
ports the role of intervention. Perhaps, in the case of South Asia, 
the earlier decade of high capital investment led to a second decade 
of high TFP growth. Or again, when the report examines the 
development experience of countries (pp. 38-39) its consistent line is 
that market oriented reforms at a particular point led to higher 
growth rates. But, for many of the same countries, the periodization 
may well be wrong. A longer historical periodization could well argue 
a first period which combined low state intervention, insertion into 
the global markets and low growth; followed by an interventionist 
state which made structural changes to the economy, leading to 
higher growth; and only then followed by a liberalization, which led 
to even higher growth. 
There are many, many other examples which can be provided 
where one can argue with the evidence cited and not cited, the 
conclusions reached and the policies recommended. This can be an 
amusing or challenging intellectual exercise if it was not for the 
importance of the views of the Bank on the lives and future possibili- 
ties of many. Its importance requires us all, individuals, professionals, 
and the institutions, in this case The World Bank and Dalhousie 
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University to examine how we can make this process of critical 
review and "learning" from the development experience more effi- 
cient and more effective in guiding better policies. For if we 
recommend to developing countries that they unilaterally open them- 
selves to free trade regimes, even if the rich do not, we minimize the 
possibility that after a few years, we do not conclude it was all a 
mistake. Mistakes cannot be avoided and certainly as we improve 
our knowledge, some of our current building blocks will be discarded, 
but we must endeavour to minimize mistakes and their impact on the 
poor. 
A first step towards improving our "learning" has been taken 
by the Bank team in its attempt to distil the experiences from 
development practice together with a framework of economic theory. 
Necessarily, the views from the Bank will be influenced by the 
chosen theoretical perspectives, the data available and also by the 
political, sociological and historical experiences and context of the 
institution. 
This should necessarily be challenged by alternate perspec- 
tives, other evidence and other interests. This is a necessary process 
to continually improve and refine our approximations of the "truth." 
It is in such a process that we have been engaged, and the Lester 
Pearson Institute for International Development and the World 
Bank must be congratulated for their roles in initiating and participat- 
ing in it. What is required, is to strengthen this process and to build 
upon it. Further steps in this direction are urgently required. To take 
it further requires greater time and resources than we can devote at 
this seminar; it requires institutions such as the Lester Pearson 
Institute to engage in it on a longer term, and on a sustained basis. It 
also requires that the Bank and other development agencies provide 
both the resources and improved processes for this search for 
"knowledge" and "truth" so that they will be more efficient, effective 
and "risk averse" in policy recommendations. 
AN OPEN LETTER TO MR. VINOD THOMAS, 
CHIEF ECONOMIST OF THE WORLD BANK 
Dear Mr. Thomas: 
We, as concerned people, believe that the period we are 
living in is crucial in determining the future of our planet. In the midst 
of tremendous political restructuring, which has bolstered the hand 
of traditional strategies of economic development, the environment 
around us deteriorates, peoples struggle to retain their cultural val- 
ues, and the numbers of poor continues to grow each day. 
These problems require careful consideration and in some 
cases radical change in our attitudes towards what constitutes devel- 
opment. The path shown by industrialized countries cannot be 
duplicated because of the strain on natural resources it would imply, 
not to mention limitations on consumer spending. The model also 
seems flawed at a human scale, as a resurgence of racism and 
prejudice is seen throughout the industrialized world. If development 
policies are to resolve the problems of poverty, cultural destruction 
and environmental degradation, the application of traditional strate- 
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gies of economic development is not sufficient. Growth in GDP per 
capita is not a good measure to gauge development. What is needed 
is an approach which equally integrates concerns of human develop- 
ment, cultural diversity and environment. While the Bank shows 
some signs of recognizing an integrated approach, the dominance 
of Structural Adjustment Policies reverses any positive trends. 
Simply opening developing countries to forces of the interna- 
tional marketplace encourages the destruction of the domestic food 
and manufacturing industries and ensures industrialization on the 
basis of low wages. Application of restrictive monetary policies 
induces a domestic recession which simultaneously reduces real 
wages and increases inflation due to the structure of consumption. 
SAPs have also prevented the upkeep of infrastructure facilities 
which permit the recurrence of diseases like cholera, produce a 
poorly educated nation and reduce economic activity. Moreover, the 
application of these policies is socially detrimental as evidenced by a 
long history of riots and government repression sparked by the 
implementation of SAPs.. 
There has been much talk lately about a redemocratization of 
the developing countries and linking this process to structural adjust- 
ment. One can seriously question the existence of democracy in the 
international sphere when every time an elected government tries to 
implement policies designed to strengthen national control or the 
domestic economy, the international community acts to destabilize 
and ostracize this country. The examples of Chile in the early 
1970s, and Peru and Nicaragua in the 1980s, emphasize this point. 
The international version of democracy seems to mean that every 
country is free to implement structural adjustment policies and noth- 
ing else. The World Bank has played a key role in winning the battle 
of ideologies, but the losers have always been the people, indig- 
enous cultures and the environment. 
If real democracy is to exist, the international community must 
respect the desire of all people to choose and implement alternative 
economic and political structures. Each time the people of develop- 
ing countries are denied these opportunities, the repercussions that 
will one day surface becomes all the more serious. It may not 
happen in your life time Mr. Thomas, but you know it will. Similarly, 
if all problems such as the debt crisis, environmental deterioration 
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and protectionism are all resolved through imposition by the indus- 
trialized nations, these resolutions will be unsustainable. 
The role of the World Bank will be vital in determining the 
course of development. If real solutions to the problems of develop- 
ing countries are to be found, the World Bank must shed off all 
ideological blinders and ensure that a balance be found in respect to 
social, political and economic concerns. It must become the voice of 
reason rather than dogma. 
The World Bank must creatively seek to resolve the debt crisis. 
It must encourage the stimulation of domestically oriented produc- 
tion in developing countries and work with elected governments to 
implement policies on which they were empowered to implement. 
Finally, the World Bank must work to protect the environment and 
cultural diversity, the two things which truly make our world a 




THE WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT (1991): 
THE CHALLENGE OF DEVELOPMENT 
March 27 & 28, 1992, Dalhousie University 
Background 
The Lester Pearson Institute for International Development 
(LPI) is convening a meeting to examine the most recent World 
Development Report (1991): The Challenge of Development. The 
report, published last'year, summarizes the lessons of past develop- 
ment thinking by the World Bank Group, and sets out a number of 
research and policy proposals for the decade ahead. The principal 
recommendations are for more market orientated policies, open 
economies, an appropriate macro-economic environment and a com- 
mitment to human resource developmet. The Bank intends this 
volume to set the course of development thinking (both at the Bank 
and elsewhere) for the immediate future. 
The LPI Colloquium will examine the assumptions and conclu- 
sions of the World Development Report and consider its value to 
researchers and development agencies (with particular reference to 
Canada) as a blueprint for development action in the years ahead. 
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Structure 
The meeting is intended to raise questions, examine issues and 
provide a forum for discussion of development in the coming decade. 
The structure of the meeting is intended to reflect this commitment 
to discussion and dialogue. Hence, while individual participants may 
be asked to be particularly prepared to contribute to certain sessions, 
there will be no "formal" papers presented, other than an "issues" 
paper for each session, which sets out some questions for initial 
discussion. 
Three themes (covering three principal sessions) have been 
identified to provide the basic content structure for the colloquium. 
These are: 
1) Does development theory determine or rationalize 
practice? 
An examination of the role of theory as a reactive and proactive 
force in the past and its challenges for the present and future, 
remembering Schumpeter's dictum that "Economic theory is 
always at least ten years behind the economy." 
2) International agencies and national states: dialogue 
for development? 
The session will discuss the international context within which 
the World Bank and developing countries policy dialogue takes 
place, and the extent to which the outcomes of these ex- 
changes promote development. 
3) Does development assistance matter? 
A consideration of aid and reform as instruments of change 
with application to Canada's ODA policy - are they comple- 
ments or substitutes? How can they be made complementary 
if they are not already? 
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Organization 
Each of the three main sessions (one for each theme) will be 
organized as follows: 
- a chair who will responsible for guiding audience participation 
and bringing the discussions to a sensible end; 
- an introduction by a person responsible for a review of main 
issues at the commencement of each session and a summary 
at the end of the session; 
- a number of participants who will be expected (primed) to 
discuss particular issues of thinking about development issues; 
- audience participation and debate of the issues. 
Participants 
A number of participants have been invited from outside the 
region. They are: 
Pierre Beemans, Director General, Corporate Affairs & Initia- 
tives Division, International Development Research Centre 
(IDRC) 
Jim Carruthers, Director, Policy & Planning, Asia Branch, 
Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) 
Don McMaster, Director General, Canadian Partnership Branch, 
Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) 
Ruben Mendez, Chief, Technical Support Division, UN Sudano- 
Sahelian Office, United Nations Development Programme 
(UNDP) 
Robert Miller, Parliamentary Centre 
Amitav Rath, Policy Research International, Ottawa 
Vinod Thomas, Chief Economist, Asia Region, World Bank, 
and principal author of the World Development Report (1991) 
Other Colloquium participants will be drawn from faculty and 
graduate students. A complete list will be provided prior to the 
meeting. 
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Background Papers . 
Apart from the World Development Report (1991) itself, the 
participants responsible for introducing the different subject areas 
will identify the key issues for the sessions to follow; these short 
papers will be available at the commencement of the colloquium. 
Venue 
The Seminar Lounge, Main Floor, Henson College of Public 
Affairs and Continuing Education, Dalhousie University, 1600 Uni- 
versity Avenue, Halifax, Nova Scotia. 
Timetable 
Friday, March 27 
12:00 Buffet Lunch for visitors - Lester Pearson Institute 
14:00 Session 1 Introduction 
Keynote Statement: The Challenge of Development - 
A review of the WDR (1991): Vinod Thomas 
Session Topic: Does development theory determine or 
rationalize practice? 
17:00 End of Session 
19:30 Dinner - Great Hall, University Club 
Speaker: Elisabeth Mann Borgese - 
"Reflections on development challenges for the 1990s" 
Saturday, March 28 
9:00 Session 2 - International agencies and national states: 
dialogue for development? 
12:00 End of Session 
12:15 Lunch - Great Hall, University Club 
13:30 Session 3 - Does development assistance matter? 
16:30 Wrap-up 
17:00 End 
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